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1.Introduction

Housing is an emotional, almost religious, topic. Indeed, even
church groups have been active in promoting public housing in
Canada and elsewhere.' The housing market has also become a
battleground for a struggle between vested property interests and
citizens' groups which insist upon a redefinition of the right to
shelter. Organizations, such as the Toronto-based People's Housing
Coalition, Halifax's Access Housing Services Association, and a
host of tenants' unions, ensure that housing problems are not hidden
from public scrutiny. Developers and landlord associations have
risen to the challenge and, under the banner of free enterprise, they
steadfastly resist any charges that they are the cause of the housing
crisis. 2 The focus of the numerous federal programs directed

towards this problem has changed direction since the 1960s, shifting
more toward the middle-income home owner. However, the shift in
the focus of these programs is not the result of a coherent policy
decision, but is a by-product of economic restraint and a changing
social mood. Indeed, a coherent policy has never been the hallmark
3
of Canada's national housing policy.
In spite of the obvious importance of housing, only in recent
years has it been fashionable to speak of it in terms of rights. Ron
Basford, then Minister of Housing, made the following policy
pronouncement in 1973: "It is the fundamental right of every
Canadian to have access to good housing at a price he can
afford . . . Housing is not simply an economic commodity that can
*Associate Professor of Law, Dalhousie University.
**Lecturer, Consumer Studies, Mount Saint Vincent University, Halifax.
1.Rev. Gary Quart, director of a low-cost housing project in Hamilton, Ontario,
explains that the church is involved in housing because the Gospel mandates it. He
cites passages from both the Old and New Testaments emphasizing the importance
of shelter. United Church, This Land is Whose Land: The Housing Squeeze (1982)
26 Issue, 14.
2. Lorimer, James, The Developers (Toronto: James Lorimer and Company,
1978). He places much of the blame for high-priced housing on the developers.
3. Dennis, M., and Fish, S., Programs in Search of a Policy (Toronto: Hakkert,
1972).
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be bought and sold according to the vagaries of the market, but a
social right. ' 4 What he meant by a "social right" and whether it
can be enforced in a legal framework are questions which will
pervade this study. The rhetoric of housing rights may have more
substantive content for middle- and upper-income Canadians than
for the residents of low-income public housing. This raises the
question of fairness in the broad sense of that term, a question which
is the focus of this paper. Specifically, the type of housing focused
on in this study is low-income housing in Canada, for it is the
provision of public housing units to disadvantaged Canadians which
causes the most political controversy and raises the most difficult
legal and economic issues. This kind of housing shall be referred to
in this paper as "public housing".
Fairness in its broad sense is very difficult to define and, indeed,
there is no absolute definition. Economists tend to use concepts of
fairness in regard to problems of allocation, while lawyers are more
likely to use the term in respect to the removal of social goods. The
sense in which fairness is advocated in this paper has many
components and it cuts across several disciplines, including law,
economics, and politics. We advocate fairness in the legal sense by
calling for the more frequent occurence of due process in both the
allocation and removal of housing. Vital to this concept is an
increased participation by the housing consumer, whose interests
are directly affected. In the economic sense, we exhort an equitable
distribution of a scarce resource and a reduction in housing
discrimination against the poor. Finally, in the political arena we
argue for the promotion of fairness in housing by the allocation of
more financial resources to the development of low-income public
housing. This would involve the creation of a larger housing pie, in
addition to a fairer distribution.
II. Background Considerations
On the legal front, the issue of housing provides an excellent case
study of the emerging public law concept of fairness. An important
element of this development is a redefinition of the kinds of rights
which deserve legal protection. Housing, in the sense of real estate,
has always been well protected, but claims of a right to access to
public housing are more novel. The arrival of Canadian Charter of
4. FederalGovernment Housing Policy Statement, released at Federal-Provincial
Housing Conference in 1973.
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Rights and Freedoms 5 (hereafter "the Charter") and its
guarantees of "liberty" and "security of the person" raise exciting
questions in the context of housing. When the equality rights come
into effect in 1985, the potential impact of the Charter on public
housing will be considerable.
How a society allocates its resources is a matter of intrinsic
interest and one which takes on larger dimensions in times of
economic restraint. Housing provides a fascinating case study in
resource distribution. While reference to housing as a societal
resource may be somewhat novel, it is nonetheless apt. In fact, it is
increasingly a scarce resource, whether in terms of privately owned
or rental units. Growing government intervention in the economy
and the impact of this on the housing field have also added a public
dimension to issues of shelter.
There are basic differences between the way Canada and other
countries, such as the United Kingdom and the United States,
handle problems related to public housing. As usual, the attitude in
Canada falls somewhere between the distrust of public housing that
is prevalent in the United States and its general acceptance in the
United Kingdom. Housing activity in the United Kingdom
emphasizes equality in the results of government policy, rather than
the equality of opportunity which seems to guide social policy in the
United States. 6 Further evidence of this basic difference between
the two countries is found in the relative importance of public
ownership. While the United Kingdom has always featured a large
public sector in its economy, the United States has never exhibited
this market structure. Instead, Americans have relied on private
ownership to direct the economy under the guiding hand of minimal
government intervention. The United Kingdom is more concerned
with the equitable distribution of the housing stock among a wide
range of income levels, while the United States is concerned only
with redistribution to the poor. Both countries have declared that a
minimum standard of basic shelter is a right of all citizens, but the
extent of the actual provision of housing is much greater in the
United Kingdom than in the United States. 7 Differences in the
perception of public housing by the electorate in the two countries
5. Part I of Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B of Canada Act, 1982 (U.K.) 1982,
c. 11.
6. Wolman, H.L., Housing and Housing Policy in the U.S. and the U.K.
(Toronto: Lexington Books, 1975) at 3.
7. lbid, at 15.

386 The Dalhousie Law Journal

may be explained by the proportion of public housing units to total
housing stock. In the United Kingdom, approximately thirty-one
percent of households rent publicly owned units; in the United
States, the corresponding figure is less than two percent. 8 Public
support is, thus, greater at the electoral level in the United Kingdom
than in the United States because voters within a much wider
income range occupy public housing in the United Kingdom.
Canada has adopted the approach of its North American
neighbour, rather than following the British tradition. Government
involvement in this country has primarily taken the form of financial
support to the private sector. The result is that assistance to
Canada's low-income housing population, in terms of an increase in
the number of public housing units available, is less than three
percent of the total housing stock. The antagonism toward the
support of public housing, while not as great as in the United States,
is still significant. 9
Few issues impinge more directly on the average Canadian than
housing problems. Newspapers contain numerous references to the
"housing crisis" in Canada. What is usually meant by the housing
crisis is the economic fact that fewer Canadians can afford to
purchase their own homes. High unemployment and the high cost of
money have conspired to prevent people from purchasing their first
home or have forced them to sell the one they had. In economic, as
well as legal, terms, a person's home is his or her castle, but there
just are not as many castles as there used to be. In fact, however,
housing problems have only been portrayed by the media as a crisis
since middle-income Canadians have felt the pinch. At the lower
levels of the socioeconomic strata, there has always been a housing
problem. Privately owned homes have long been beyond the reach
of the poor. Their real concerns have been the availability of
reasonable rental accommodations and accessible public housing.
Tenants have banded together in unions to press claims for security
of tenure and decent living conditions. In times of shrinking
government budgets, there are genuine concerns about the degree of
8. Ibid, at 13. Figures are for 1972. Figures for 1978 in the United Kingdom were
slightly higher, at 32 percent, with England at 30 percent, Wales at 29 percent, and
Scotland at 54 percent. See Cullingworth, J.B., Canadian Housing Policy
Research: Some Initial Impressions (Toronto: University of Toronto Center for
Urban and Community Studies, 1980) at 9.
9. Rose, A., Canadian Housing Policies 1935-1980 (Toronto: Butterworths & Co.
(Can.), 1980) at 192.
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social commitment to public housing. The method for allocating
public housing acquires new importance when there is considerable
excess demand for the existing supply of units. The formation of
special interest housing lobbies has been one response to this
housing shortage.
Not all groups have responded to the housing crisis by lobbying
the government for increased assistance. However, because the
private market has simply failed to produce housing that is within
the reach of low-income people, an attractive alternative is
cooperative housing, a movement that has maintained the
momentum it developed during the 1960s. Of course, the
affordability of cooperative housing is explained, in large part, by
the assistance it receives from the federal government. 1 0 One of the
most appealing aspects of this approach to housing is that the
consumer has more autonomy. The subsidy required per unit of
cooperative housing is also lower than that required for traditional
public housing.
Predictably, an exploration of housing issues will embroil the
explorer in economic matters; the legal dimensions are less
apparent. However, the procedures by which government housing
authorities grant or remove the benefit of shelter do raise questions
of administrative law. Traditionally, Canadian courts have attached
certain procedural protections to the removal of property rights.
These rights are akin to the assurance of due process as mandated by
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the American Constitution. In Canadian terms, courts have been concerned about
providing a fair hearing before an objective decision-maker; the
focus has been on procedural aspects and Canada has not adopted
the more extensive American model of substantive due process. The
willingness of courts to grant procedural protections has been
greatly influenced by the kind of housing rights at issue, as well as
the expansiveness of their content. In Cooper v. Wandsworth Board
of Works," the court came quickly to the defence of a man whose
house had been knocked down by the government. The case
involved the removal of classic property rights, so the court implied
a common law right to a hearing, even though the statute was silent
on the point. Meanwhile, in Re Webb and Ontario Housing
10. Laidlaw, A., Housing You Can Afford (Toronto: Green Tree Publishing Co.,
1977).
11. (1863), 14C.B.(N.S.) 180.
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Corporation,12 the courts were willing to grant only the minimum
requirements of fair procedure before a single-parent mother was
denied the benefits of subsidized rental accommodation. The
Ontario court also made it clear that the original grant of subsidized
tenancy would attract no procedural protections. In Webb, the court
used the neutral term "benefits", thus avoiding the use of either
"rights" or "privileges", which have become legal terms of art.
Rights, upon removal, are protected by fair procedures, while mere
privileges result from governmental acts of grace and are not subject
to legal protections. Not surprisingly, courts have been quite
traditional in their attempts to distinguish rights from privileges.
Classic property rights have been well protected, while newer
interests have not fared so well.
Charles Reich argues, in a seminal article, that government
largesse in the context of the welfare state is as worthy of legal
protection as traditional property interests.la Indeed, he asserts that
a "new property" has emerged that is as important and as deserving
of protection as land was in the feudal context. Because the
American due process protections are specifically tied to property,
Reich felt that a broader definition of property was essential. In
Canada, procedural protections have no constitutional link with
property. This is still true, as property rights are not specifically
mentioned in the Charter. In fact, the legislative and committee
debates reveal that property rights were quite deliberately omitted to
appease the provinces. Thus, expanding the definition of property
may not be vital to extending procedural protection in Canada. 14
Although the economic dimensions of housing are more
apparent, they are as complex and confusing as the legal
dimensions. Governments adopt various ways to promote housing
objectives and it is often difficult to identify a coherent policy. Tax
incentives, special interest programs, and subsidized mortgages are
but a few of the economic devices developed in order to execute
government policy. Furthermore, to the extent that there is an
identifiable economic policy, it is concerned more with efficiency
than with fairness. There is also an element of political expediency
at work, for economic programs are never far removed from their
12. (1978), 93 D.L.R. (3d) 187 (Ont. C.A.).
13. C. Reich, The New Property (1964), 73 Yale L.J. 733.
14. I. Christie, "The Nature of the Lawyer's Role in the Administrative Process"
( 1971), SpecialLectures (L. S. U.C., Toronto) 1, at 27.
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political and social climate. Thus, the interconnection of politics,
law, and economics is a recurring theme throughout this study.
Unfortunately, legal choices are usually made in ignorance of
their economic impact, and economic decisions are taken without
regard to legal concepts of fairness. Fair procedures do have a price,
and the real question is to what extent governments will be willing
to bear the cost. Some efforts will be made in this study to
empirically assess the fairness of existing practices. However,
before tackling the difficult problem of defining what is meant by
fairness in both legal and economic terms, the confusing division of
authority over housing will be considered.
III. Jurisdictionover Housing
Housing is a subject which cuts across traditional classifications of
government authority. In the United States, authority over public
housing has been described as arising out of the fundamental
objectives of government to protect the health, safety, and general
welfare of the public.' 5 Thus, the impact of federal authority on
American housing policy has been great. Unlike the division of
authority that exists in the United States, Canadian housing
problems are most frequently handled at the local level. This is true
in practical, as well as constitutional, terms. However, the National
Housing Act 1 6 (hereafter "the NHA") does provide a significant
federal presence through which federal funding can be used to set
housing priorities. Federal fiscal superiority has been a counterbalance to provincial constitutional superiority in the housing field.
Furthermore, the courts exercise their powers of review over both
local and federal housing agencies and thereby set some minimal
standards at the national level.
(a) Evolution of Housing Authority
The issue of housing has been plagued, more than most Canadian
concerns, by a rather confusing division of authority between the
provinces and the federal government. General authority over
housing in Canada rests with the provinces by virtue of section
92(13) of the Constitution Act, 1867,17 whereby a province may
make laws exclusively in relation to property and civil rights within
15. New York City Housing Authority v. Muller (1936) 270 N.Y. 33.
16. R.S.C. 1970, c. N-10.
17. 30-31 Vict., c. 30 (U.K.); R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II.

390 The Dalhousie Law Journal

its boundaries. 18 The federal government's involvement, which
takes place on a general, but limited, basis and which began with
The Dominion Housing Act, 1935,19 was justified by the
importance of housing problems to the national interest. 20 The real
heart of federal jurisdiction is its spending power; the power of the
purse strings should not be underestimated. 21 A third govemment
actor in the housing field is the municipal units. This level of
government receives no mention in the Constitution Act, 1867, and,
in a legal sense, the units receive their power as delegates of the
province. This means that priorities in local housing tend to be set at
the provincial level, the policy directions of which may conflict
with municipal housing objectives.
It is not an easy task to clearly identify the roles of the various
levels of government involved in the actual process of providing
housing services to the Canadian public. None of the various
governments has ever clearly stated its housing goals or how
programs were designed to attain them. 22 While specific housing
policies are always provisional, due to the changing nature of
housing problems, the evidence indicates that the pace of change
has been due to political exigency as much as, if not more than, to
23
the nature of the problems being addressed.
The 1964 amendments to the NHA marked the first appearance of
18. Several matters relating to housing fall within specified classes of subjects in s.
92 of the Constitution Act, 1867. Municipalities and the incorporation of
companies with provincial objectives are but two examples. To the extent that
housing is considered either a social responsibility or a function of the private
market, it falls within the provincial domain.

19. S.C. 1935, c. 58.
20. The claims to federal jurisdiction are based upon sections 91(la) and 91(3) of
the Constitution Act, 1867. Section 91( 1a) gives Parliament the right to legislate in
relation to the public debt and property and section 91(3) grants a general authority
to raise money. Although section 91(2) - the trade and commerce power - is a
potential source of housing jurisdiction, that head of power has been narrowly
construed.
21. During the depression of the 1930s, the provincial treasuries were so depleted
that they had no real economic alternative to surrendering some of their jurisdiction
over social welfare. Thus, unemployment insurance became a federal responsibility
by way of constitutional amendment.
22. Supra, note 9 at 32.
23. For a more complete analysis of federal and provincial housing policies, see
Rose, A., supra, note 9; Lithwick H., Urban Canada: Problems and Prospects
(Ottawa: CMHC, 1970); Dennis, M., and Fish, S, supra, note 3. For an interesting
analysis of the treatment of low-rental housing programs under NHA, see S. Fish,
Administrative Discretion in Social Housing Policy (1972), 10 Osgoode Hall L.J.
209.
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the term "public housing". 24 Public housing agencies were
redefined to include corporations "wholly owned by the government of a province or agency thereof" or by "one or more
municipalities in a province".25 This broadening of public housing
operations brought some of the provinces into the field for the first
time. The 1964 revisions prodded the provinces into assuming the
housing responsibilities that accompanied their constitutional
mandates and encouraged more active participation at the local
level, both of which were achieved through the manipulation of
federal government spending power. The increasingly visible role
of the provinces after 1964 resulted in most of the credit for housing
provision being directed toward the provinces and away from the
principal source of funding the federal government. The
motivating force behind the establishment of a Task Force on
Housing and Urban Development in 1968 was the desire on the part
of the federal government to rationalize its expenditures on housing
programs. 26 It succeeded in increasing the visibility of the federal
government and in providing support "from the people" for federal
direction in housing policy.
The final report of the task force, which contained many
recommendations, caused considerable controversy. One such
recommendation held that a federal Department of Housing and
Urban Affairs should be established, an idea which was rejected by
the government primarily because it was thought that the inclusion
of the term "housing" might indicate an invasion of provincial
constitutional territory. Because no level of government had been
given specific constitutional responsibility for "urban affairs", a
Ministry of State for Urban Affairs was established in 1971.27 The
Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (hereafter "CMHC")
was to report to the new minister. Up to this point, CMHC had
operated as an autonomous body and was beyond the direct control
of Parliament. However, starting in 1971, its activities were

24. Part IV of the NHA was renamed "Public Housing".
25. S.C. 1953-54, c. 23, s. 35B as amended by S.C. 1964-65, c. 15, s. 9.
26. Canada, Report of the Task Force of Housing and Urban Development
(Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969). Paul Hellyer was appointed chairman.
27. From the start, there was confusion surrounding the relationship between the
new ministry and The Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation. CMHC had
reason to feel threatened, as one of the first tasks the ministry set itself was the
appointment of new men to several key positions within the corporation.
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controlled by the new ministry, which reported to Parliament. 28 In
the view of many CMHC critics, the creation of a new thinistry that
would exercise some control over the corporation was a step in the
right direction. 29 It was also recommended that the nature and role
of public housing be de-emphasized and that no more large public
housing projects be built. The ban on urban renewal and public
housing projects, in effect since the establishment of the 1968
Hellyer Task Force, was continued by the new ministry. During the
years from 1968 to 1972, the provinces had to wait for the federal
government to decide on future directions. The power exerted by
the federal government was never more evident, as provincial
housing programs came to a virtual standstill without the support of
30
federal capital contributions.
The various amendments enacted in 1973 in response to the
Hellyer Task Force 3 l had the combined effect of forcing both
provinces 32 and municipalities to review their legislation, with the
result that such legislation is now virtually identical across Canada.
The changes were adopted to meet new requirements for the
financing available under the terms of the NHA. The act also
emphasized a relatively new trend, the rehabilitation of existing
housing, rather than the building of new public housing, and the
provision of housing for the elderly, rather than for low-income
tenants. The elderly had two major virtues in the eyes of planners:
they were becoming a significant voting block and they tended to be
less troublesome to house than single-parent families with numerous
children.
(b) The Role of the Courts
The NHA is unquestionably a powerful factor in the determination
of housing priorities by the other levels of government, but it is not
the only means by which housing policy is implemented in Canada.
A wide range of activities are employed, particularly at the local
level, which greatly influence the delivery of housing services to
local residents.
28. Until 1971, responsibility for CMHC had always been considered a minor
portfolio for a cabinet minister, with the result that CMHC received little attention.
29. Supra, note 9 at 50.
30. Supra, note 9 at 77.
31. S.C. 1973-74, c. 18.

32. Between 1970 and 1972, Nova Scotia amended all of its basic housing
legishtion.
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The bulk of decisions affecting housing are concerned with
land-use planning, in which the role of the province is primarily one
of coordinator. The provinces must, under provincial planning
statutes, approve all municipal development plans and the bylaws
associated with them. The power of ministerial review over
decisions made at the local level allows the provinces to ensure that
local decisions will not conflict with provincial planning objectives.
The municipal power over housing decisions generated through
the use of zoning bylaws is a double-edged sword. The objective of
such bylaws is to ensure a rational pattern of development by
segregating land use on the basis of compatibility. These same
powers often result in the production of less housing that is suitable
for low-income individuals and families, on the grounds that it is
not "compatible" with land-use patterns already in existence. In
addition, because the municipal tax base provides the major source
of funds for municipal operations, there is an incentive for
developing land for its best economic use and to the greatest extent
possible. 33 Given the choice between supplying luxury condominiums or low-rental housing units, the government recognizes
that the former will increase tax returns, while the latter will deplete
tax coffers as a result of the subsidies required to finance them. The
two alternatives may involve similar housing densities, but
low-rental housing could be expected to require ongoing subsidization, as well as the provision of increased levels of community
services to cope with the higher proportion of children per unit.
The responsibility for ensuring that housing is provided for
low-income individuals and families thus places the municipalities
in an unfortunate dilemma. The demand for such services is higher
during periods of economic stress, requiring the reduction of
services elsewhere to fund them. It is extremely difficult for
municipally elected officials to balance the demands and needs of
competing groups in an equitable fashion when the voting majority
is most often comprised of middle- and higher-income individuals
who do not wish to see a reduction in services to themselves. Thus,
33. As the value of inner-city land increases, so does its municipal assessment.
The resulting increase in property taxes may create enough of a burden to the
present owner that he or she must sell. The new buyer is likely to use the property
for some activity that will generate more income. Scotia Square in Halifax is a
commercial development that replaced slum housing in what was formerly known
as the Jacob Street area. It is now the single largest provider of municipal taxes in
the city.
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the most effective means of screening out development that will
both strain the tax base and alienate local inhabitants is to zone for
land uses which are not affordable by low-income groups.
(i) Local Review
Such exclusionary zoning practices 3 4 have come under considerable
fire in the United States in the last ten years and have resulted in the
development and enforcement of fair-share plans. A fair-share plan
is one "which typically determines where housing, especially low
and moderate-income units, should be built within a region
according to such criteria as placing housing where it will expand
housing opportunity, where it is most needed, and where it is most
suitable. Fair-share plans hope to improve the status quo by
allocating units in a rational and equitable fashion . . . [and
emphasize] . . . expanding housing opportunity usually, but not

exclusively, for low and moderate-income families' .3 5 The attitude
of the United States courts has been to regard exclusionary zoning
statutes which impose minimum lot sizes and maximum building
heights as unconstitutional. 3 6 In Canada, however, there has been
far less court interference with zoning power. In general, the courts
are likely to defer to experts in planning agencies or to municipal
councils that are closer to the electorate. It is rare that a local bylaw
will be struck down as discriminatory, because the courts only
interfere where there is evidence of jurisdictional errors, such as
37
abuse of discretion. There are some exceptions, however.
In Canada, the courts prevent discrimination on the basis of race,
sex, creed, and other specified grounds by enforcing the provincial
human rights statutes, and will now also do so under section 15 of
the Charter. 38 Thus, the role of the Canadian courts in these matters
34. Other common American practices are the assessment for property tax
purposes of lower-value properties and of properties in poorer neighbourhoods at a
higher percentage of market value on average than other properties in an area. They
result in part from political pressures and the use of certain inappropriate appraisal
techniques. See K.K. Baar, Property tax assessment discrimination against low
income neighbourhoods (1982), 1 Property Tax Journal, (No. 1),1.
35. Listoken, D., FairShare Housing Allocation (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers

U. Center for Urban Policy Research, 1976) at 1.
36. Ibid, at 14.
37. Hollett v. City of Halifax (1975), 58 D.L.R. (3d) 746 (N.S.S.C.) and R. v.
Bell (1979), 26 N.R. 457 (S.C.C.).
38. G.J. Smith, in The New Planning Act v. The Charter of Rights (1983),

Municipal World 87 (two parts - April and May), suggests that the Charter may
have a significant impact on planning.
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is closer to the British model of deference to the policy-makers than
to the situation in the United States, where interference by the courts
is more frequent.
(ii) FederalReview
Judicial review of crown agencies, such as CMHC, pose special
problems. 3 9 Since such agencies are established by a statute of
Parliament, they are supposedly reviewable in the political arena.
Ministerial review of CMHC has been minimal, due primarily to its
frequent pairing with a major cabinet portfolio, such as transportation, which leaves little time for a minister to oversee its activities.
CMHC performs two separate functions. The first, essentially a
private market function, is to reduce inefficiencies in capital
markets in Canada which restrict the development of mortgage
markets. It achieves this by acting as a mortgage insurer, thereby
reducing the degree of risk to private-market financial institutions
and increasing the supply of mortgage funds to home owners.
CMHC's second function is a public one. It acts as the administrator
of housing programs which allocate public funds, and thus directly
affects the rights and privileges of individuals. When exercising its
role as a social agency, CMHC could be subject to the Federal Court
Act, 40 as it falls within the definition of a "federal board,
41
commission or other tribunal" outlined in section 2 of that Act.
(iii) ConstitutionalLimitations
The recent Supreme Court of Canada decision limiting the
decision-makings powers of Residential Tenancy Boards has
opened the door to greater intervention by the courts. 42 This change
may secure more consistent procedural fairness in the protection of
individual rights, but it has important economic implications which
affect fairness in a broader sense. A ruling that requires individuals
to seek protection of their rights only in section 96 courts, as defined
by the Constitution Act, 1867, may result in protecting only those
39. Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-16, s.
5(4), states that although CMHC is an agent of the crown, it is subject to some legal
actions.
40. S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 1.
41. Ibid, s. 2(g).
42. Re Ontario Residential Tenancies Act (1981), 37 N.R. 158 (S.C.C.). An
equivalent Nova Scotia decision is Burke v. Arab (1982), 49 N.S.R. (2d) 181
(N.S.C.A.).
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who can afford the costs associated with these judicial procedures.
Tenancy boards provide a more expeditious and less expensive
means for resolving disputes. As in the case of exclusionary zoning,
those most in need of assistance may be unable to avail themselves
of required services. The greater degree of protection afforded by
the new ruling will benefit those who have money, but not the poor.
It is important to note that increased judicial intervention in housing
matters can have a negative, as well as a positive, influence.
IV. Fairnessin the Context of Economic Policy
The economists' fascination with the issue of housing lies in the fact
that society tends to treat inequality in basic shelter, along with
inequality in nutrition, access to medical care, and legal assistance,
differently from inequality in goods such as books, automobiles, or
vacations. 43 The characteristic that sets housing apart is that
consumption by one individual produces external effects, or
externalities, 4 4 which have a direct impact on the well-being of
other members of the community. These externalities may be
negative, as in the case of poor quality housing which offends the
sensibilities of all who look upon it, or positive, as in the case of a
well-maintained house with tasteful landscaping which not only
creates personal joy in the eyes of beholders, but increases the
property values of neighbouring landowners. The link that has been
established between poor housing conditions and poor health, low
levels of educational achievement, and high crime rates is further
45
indication of the externalities associated with housing.
It is this very interdependence in the determination of personal
utility, or satisfaction, 46 that intrigues economists because it
demands that special consideration be given to the production and
43. J. Tobin, On Limiting the Domain of Inequality (1970), J. Law and Economics
263,265.
44. These external effects are also referred to as externalities, external economies
or diseconomics, spillover effects, and neighbourhood effects.
45. For a discussion of the effects of public housing on the social behaviour
patterns of families relocated from slum housing to Mulgrave Park, Halifax, see B.
Sutherland, Housing Conditions and Behavioural Patterns: A Study of the
Relationship Between Relocation from Physically Deprived Housing Conditions
and Social Behaviour Patterns, Master's Thesis, Maritime School of Social Work
and Saint Mary's University, Halifax, 1967.
46. The functions used by economists to indicate the level of well-being or
satisfaction of an individual based on personal preferences are called personal
utility functions. They are not measurable, but may be ranked ordinally.
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consumption of this good to insure that its potential benefits to
society are maximized. If all individuals are left to choose their own
housing, then some may "underconsume". Whether substandard
units are occupied due to free choice (consumer sovereignty), lack
of choice (scarcity of adequate units), lack of income, or a
combination of these factors, the result will be a net loss to society.
Interdependence also indicates that a redistribution, or transfer of
resources from the wealthier members of society to those who are
poorly housed, would benefit the givers as well as the receivers.
Since a system which relied upon individual initiative and
participation is unlikely to achieve the desired redistribution, an
alternative must be found if society is to capture all potential
benefits.
Recognition of externalities provides an incentive for individuals
to act collectively. It suggests that there is a unique level of
consumption preferred by society and that everyone should receive
at least this amount. 47 However, a general acceptance that some
sort of collective action is required still leaves many questions
unanswered. What is the socially desired minimum level of
consumption, and what redistribution is required to achieve it? How
are the recipients to be chosen and identified? Should income or the
goods themselves be transferred, and by what mechanism and by
whom? What are the "best" or the "fairest" means of achieving
social objectives? Solutions to these problems, or the lack thereof,
will be discussed more directly in our analysis of public housing.
These are all questions for social choice theory and, as such, are
beyond the limitations of pure economics alone. However, the role
played by economic analysis in the exercise of choice by social
organizations, such as government, is vital to the decision-making
process as a whole. Since we will be examining social choice in the
realm of housing and housing policy, it is necessary to clearly
outline the extent and limitations of economic analysis before
proceeding further.
(a) Limitations of Economic Analysis
The determination of what is in the social interest, or what is fair
and good, does not come from the objective application of social
scientific principles, since the final decision will require the
application of "unscientific"
value judgments. However, the
47. Culyer, A. J., The Economics of Social Policy (N.Y.: Dunellin, 1973) at 206.
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careful and objective assessment of alternatives that should precede
any decision must be based on sound, social science methodology.
Economics has no difficulty in meeting these requirements. In
addition, it is important in any decision process to clearly determine
where social science methodology has been superceded by
ideological interpretation. Beyond that point, pure economics has
nothing to say and any criticisms must be directed at the judgment
of decision-makers, rather than at the tools of analysis. These same
tools, it must be remembered, are equally supportive of different
policy prescriptions based on such divergent ideologies as
communism and capitalism!
Economists are very careful to distinguish between two branches
of analysis within their discipline, those of positive and of
normative economics. The former is intended to analyze and predict
48
observable events and is completely value-free in its assumptions.
The latter approach is used to make value judgments about what
ought to be done and inferences are drawn from these basic ethical
assumptions in order to recommend specific courses of action.
Consider, for example, a positive statement such as "the
distribution of income [in Canada] in 1975 was more unequal than
in 1967". 49 This statement is objective, being based on the results
of a carefully constructed analysis, and makes no reference to
whether the described situation is to be considered "good" or
"bad". However, a normative statement, such as "present policies
are neither fair nor effective [in that] some low income taxpayers are
°
subsidizing the rents of families with equal or higher income,''S
does not simply state what is, but judges the facts in light of some
principle of fairness.
Positive economics alone cannot recommend the means that
should be adopted to achieve a social goal. It can only objectively
outline the costs and benefits of various alternatives. Normative
analysis, conditional as it is upon value judgments imposed from
outside the discipline, may take up where positive economics leaves
off and recommend a particular policy. At this point, the analysis
leaves the realm of pure economics and enters that of the
48. Some economists would argue that there is no such thing as value-free
economic theory.
49. Henderson, D. W., and Rowley, J.C.R., The Distribution and Evolution of
Canadian Family Income, 1965-1973 (Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada,

1977), Discussion Paper no. 91.
50. Supra, note 43 at 275.
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"economics of social policy". This is particularly important to keep
in mind when evaluating housing policy, in view of the changing
nature of the problem. The tools of economic theory do not change,
but the housing situation, as well as the criteria by which it is
judged, are constantly shifting. 5 1
(b) Economic Efficiency and the ParetoCriterion
Economics as a social science, then, does not deal with fairness.
Rather, it is primarily concerned with efficiency, a term which is
often used in a technical sense to mean that method of production
which results in the greatest level of output for a given level of
input. Assuming that the quality of output is identical, a small
building contractor who could produce two housing units at the
same cost as his competitor's single unit would be considered the
more efficient. The definition of efficiency that will be used in the
analysis which follows, and which is assumed in economic
literature whenever an alternative definition is not explicitly
introduced, is much broader than technical efficiency. Rather, it
holds that society has allocated its resources efficiently when no
further change can be effected without making at least one person
worse off. Since changes in individual welfare are not measurable,
"the only guide, in general, that the economist allows to indicate
such improvements in social welfare is when individuals voluntarily
agree to arrangements". 5 2 Any course of action is judged to be
good if those who are affected by it also agree unanimously that it is
so. This criterion, by which any change in social welfare may be
judged, is referred to in economic literature as the Pareto
criterion. 53 Any change to which all members of society agree is
termed a Pareto improvement, and when all potential gains from
exchange that can be unanimously agreed upon have been
exhausted, a Pareto optimum has been achieved. Since the Pareto
optimum is the state of economic efficiency, any Pareto
improvements would also be improvements in efficiency.
The Pareto criterion provides economists with a philosophically
consistent rule for evaluating whether or not a particular change is in
the social interest. Any policy that meets the Pareto criterion would
51. Donnison, D.V., The Government of Housing (Harmondsworth,
Penguin Books, 1967) at 18.
52. Supra, note 47 at 5.
53. After Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian sociologist and economist.

Eng.:
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be determined unambiguously to be in the social interest, without
having to employ value judgments or the measurement of personal
levels of satisfaction. Consistent or not, this rule has very limited
usefulness. It leaves no room for policy and planning, which
become necessary components of the choice process when certain
desirable objectives are not being met. Thus, some economists have
extended the application of the criterion for economic efficiency to
include redistribution which "corrects" individual choice. The very
nature of an externality-producing good, such as housing, makes it
difficult for many individuals to correctly evaluate its potential
benefits. They may underestimate, or fail to recognize, the
importance to their own welfare of a subsistence transfer towards
those who are poorly housed. For example, a one-hundred dollar
contribution from each of twenty families in a neighbourhood to
repair the exterior of the one obviously substandard unit in the area
might increase the property value of all other units by an average of
one thousand dollars. In cases such as this, an imposed
redistribution which produced "choices which the individual
himself would be able to recognize [ex post facto] as
'superior' . . . [would be] . . . quite consistent with consumer
sovereignty, broadly interpreted" .54
Even with this extension of the application of the Pareto criterion,
it is still evident that the possibility of redistribution on purely
economic grounds is extremely limited and is unlikely to form the
base of any social policy. Beyond this point, economics is just one
tool among many 55 by which the social interest, once it has been
defined, may be furthered. Put another way, it is highly unlikely
that social goals may be achieved by means of a single analytic tool,
such as economics or law. The corollary of this claim is that
criticism from a single point of view, such as economics, is not
sufficient evidence on which to reject a policy. Social policy, which
concerns itself so profoundly with fairness, cannot be dictated by
economic theory alone.
(c) Housing Policy: Who Should Be Responsible?
The perceived need for some sort of collective action does not in
itself determine who is to coordinate, fund, or provide housing
units. There appear to be three potential candidates for this role. The
54. Head, J. Merit Goods Revisited, (1969), 28 Finanzarchiv at 215.

55. Other similar tools are law and political science.
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first group, the voluntary sector, which is comprised of
philanthropists and organizations such as churches and community
groups, has certainly been responsible for the provision of housing
to some of the less fortunate members of society. However, the
limit to the amount of income that will be voluntarily transferred
from the richer members of society to the poorer tends to fluctuate
positively with economic cycles. This results in fewer funds being
made available during difficult economic times, when they are most
desperately needed. Due to the inconsistency of support from this
sector, it cannot be relied upon to ensure adequate housing for all
members of society. 5 6 Private-market provision cannot be relied
upon either. "In a capitalist market economy the housing industry,
by definition, must produce for those who have the resources to take
its products off the market. Otherwise capitalist entrepreneurs
would be forced out of business. This has meant, and can only
mean, that adequate housing is not provided automatically for those
persons with modest or inadequate resources. "' 5 7 Therefore,
government, the third candidate, is usually required to intervene in
some form in order to counteract the occurrance of less-thanefficient production and consumption of housing. It is assumed that
government will more clearly reflect the social interest and will
have the power to forcibly redistribute resources by manipulating
fiscal and monetary incentives to encourage greater levels of
support from both the voluntary and market sectors. Acceptance of
the need for action on the part of government does not determine the
extent of action required or whether government should be involved
in the provision or the financing of housing or both. It still remains
to be resolved whether government should play a leading or
supporting role. While the justification for some government
participation in the provision of housing is supportable in terms of
economic efficiency, the final role will inevitably be shaped by each
country's social and political traditions.
The hazards associated with government control of the national
purse strings have been well documented by political theorists.
Downs' hypothesis, for example, assumes that government will
always act so as to maximize the number of votes in the next
election and, thus, will formulate policies not for the social interest,
56. Such voluntary provision is consistent with the Pareto criterion and would,

therefore, be considered an improvement in economic efficiency.
57. Supra, note 9 at 2.
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but to serve special interest groups. 58 "Each level of government
has its own constituency and its job is to serve the interests of that
constituency however narrow these may be." 5 9 The resulting
distribution of public funds has done more to confirm and reinforce
the inequalities already dividing society than it has to further the
social interest. 6 ° There is clearly a need to control the
decision-maker's ability to identify the social interest with his own
if we are to avoid government power being wielded arbitrarily or in
the interests of a few. The courts are one means of control, and they
will be considered more fully later in this study. The potential for
bias in the exercise of discretion by public officials in the
distribution of housing benefits will also receive considerable
discussion in later sections of this paper.
Regardless of the pattern that is chosen in an attempt to meet
social housing needs, there is the ever-present danger that the
redistribution of benefits will not flow in a socially desirable
direction. Even if perfection is denied us, the objective of housing
policy should be to find the least imperfect method of approaching
an equitable allocation of scarce housing resources.
(d) Objectives of Housing Policy
All countries seem to state the achievement of a comprehensive
housing policy as an objective, but no country seems to have
achieved it. 6 1 Part of the difficulty may lie in the inability of
62
policy-makers to precisely define the term "housing policy".
Another problem is policies which are inherently conflicting.
Most modern societies include both equity and efficiency in the
statements of their national objectives. 63 Since in practice these
goals conflict not only with each other, but also with other
economic, social, and political objectives, governments are faced
with the difficult task of minimizing, as much as possible, the
inherent conflicts among policy objectives. In many cases, this
seems an impossible task. Due to the conflicting nature of pressures
58. Downs, A., An Economic Theory ofDemocracy (N.Y.: Harper, 1957).
59. Cullingworth, supra, note 8 at 20.
60. Supra, note 51 at 11.
61. D.V. Donnison, Towards a comprehensive housing service, Conference of
English Housing Authorities, October 1971.
62. Aaron, H. J., Shelter and Subsidies: Who Benefits from Federal Housing
Policies? (Wash. D.C.: Brookings, 1972) at 4.
63. G. L. Reuber, The Inpact of Government Policies on the Distribution of
Income in Canada: a Review (1978), 3 Canadian Public Policy, 505 at 505.
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from these quarters, the already inadequate resources available to
government are often wastefully dispersed on a large number of
small programs and on projects which may confer their greatest
benefits upon those best able to resolve their own housing problems.
The final policy choices may not reflect what is deemed most fair by
society or most efficient in economic terms, but what is most
politically acceptable.
V. ConstitutionalProtectionsand the Charter of Rights
The arrival of the Charter of Rights has already had dramatic impact
upon the manner in which legal issues arise in Canada; it will be
several years before Canadians will know whether it will have a
significant long-term impact on the protection of rights. However,
while the Charter is still in its infancy, it offers great scope for
innovative legal argument. Not all aspects of its potential
application to the issue of housing will be explored here. 6 4 Indeed,
in order to realistically explore the exciting possibilities of the
Charter of Rights, its limits must be considered.
(a) State Action
Few aspects of public life will escape the reach of the Charter;
however, its application is not universal. It is aimed at public or
state violations of rights, rather than private violations, and this was
the clear intent of the drafters of the document. 6 5 The focus on state
violation is also clear from the wording of section 32 in the Charter
itself. The difficulties implicit in defining state action and the value
of the American experience with this issue have been ably discussed
by constitutional scholars, 66 and these problems shall not be
examined here.
64. For example, there are some rather exotic arguments that section 7 guarantees
a right to privacy which would have important implications for public housing. It
could also be argued that s. 36 of the Constitution Act, 1982, dealing with
equalization of services, adds at least a moral claim to minimal national standards
of public housing. Other claims will arise as the Charter unfolds.
65. Testimony of F.J.E. Jordan, Senior Counsel, Public Law, Federal Department
of Justice, in Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee
of the Senate and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, First
Session of the Thirty-Second Parliament, 1980-81, Issue 49, at 47 (January 30,
198 1). The Hon. Jean Chr~tien, then Minister of Justice, made statements to the
same effect in Issue 49 at 30-31.
66. Hogg, P. W., Canada Act, 1982 Annotated (Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd.,
1982) at 75-78. K. Swinton, "Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
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Regulations made by a Minister of Housing or the bylaws of a
city council or local housing authority will be clearly captured by
the Charter. Internal policy guidelines and administrative practices
are not as easily classified. However, since the police, as
administrators of the criminal law, are bound by the dictates of the
Charter, the same constraint should apply to bureaucrats who
administer public housing. Housing authorities have been defined as
crown agents who dispense public housing. 6 7 Crown agents may
fall within the scope of the Charter of Rights, but only if they are
engaged in state action in which the dispensing of housing would
surely be included. Agencies which are not part of the Crown may
also be engaged in government action, as the law relating to crown
68
status is only one of the factors the courts may consider.
Drawing the line between private and government action is
particularly problematic in Canada because of its history of state
involvement in important segments of the economy - transportation, communications, and, to a lesser extent, housing. 69 Whether
or not an agency is engaged in an essentially private commercial
activity is one of the factors considered in deciding whether the
entity is a crown agent. This test should also be relevant in
determining the applicability of the Charter.
Although CMHC, established under the Canada Mortgage and
Housing Corporation Act, 70 has been primarily concerned with
making mortgage money available and with insuring loans, it has
assumed responsibility over the years for an increasing number of
public-oriented housing programs. Some examples are the Rural
and Native Housing Program, the Assisted Home Ownership
Program, Neighbourhood Improvement and Rehabilitation Programs, and the Home Insulation Program. In administering this type
Freedoms", in W. Tarnopolsky and G. Beaudoin, CanadianCharterof Rights and

Freedoms: Commentary (Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd., 1982) at 44-49. L. Tribe,
American ConstitutionalLaw (New York: Foundation Press, 1978) ch. 18.
67. R. v. OntarioLabour Relations Board, ex parte OntarioHousing Corporation

(1971), 19 D.L.R. (3d) 47 (Ont. H.C.). Presumably, residential tenancy boards
and rent review commissions would be swept into the same net. However, crown
status depends upon the facts, especially the statute, in each particular case.
68. Swinton, supra, note 66 at 54-59; Swinton alludes to certain American tests,
such as "public access", "public function", and "degree of government
involvement". The nexus between the agency in question and the government is
crucial.
69. K. Swinton, Federalism and ProvincialGovernment Immunity (1979), 29 U.
of T.L.J. I at 28-31 and, supra, note 66 at 57.

70. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-16.
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of program and distributing the benefits which flow from them,
CMHC is engaged in government activity and should be subject to
the Charter. However, in its role as mortgage insurer, it acts more
like a private enterprise and, like its sister crown corporation, Air
Canada, should not be subject to the Charter. 7 1 In general, the line
between what is public and what is private government action has
become blurred in recent years.
Many government actors will be subject to the limits of the
Charter. Moreover, private corporations which either derive their
authority from statute or are heavily subsidized by public funding
may also find themselves restricted by it. 7 2 A cooperative housing
unit that is set up under express legislation and subsidized by federal
funding may provide an interesting test case for the courts.
Regardless of who is caught by the Charter, it is time to consider
what new limits, if any, will be imposed.
(b) Liberty, Security of the Person, and FundamentalJustice
There is a provision in the Charter which may add a constitutional
dimension to the argument for rights to such things as social
assistance, socialized medicine, and public housing. It is section 7,
which reads as follows: "Everyone has the right to life, liberty and
security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except
in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice."
(i) Affirmative Rights
What, if anything, does section 7 of the Charter add to claims for
fairness in the allocation of housing? In respect to "life, liberty and
security of the person", there is an affirmative guarantee of rights,
rather than a negative check on the actions of government, as is the
norm in the American Constitution. Taken literally, these
affirmative rights could embrace guarantees of minimum levels of
income, adequate medical treatment, and decent housing. Such a
broad interpretation would produce a dramatic recognition of the
71. Swinton, supra, note 69 at 39, argues that an agency which acts in a private
commercial fashion should not be bound by the Charterof Rights but only when it
affects responsibilities as between the individual and the state. This analysis
necessitates a division of the CMHC mandate.
72. Every statutory corporation is not ipso facto an arm of the executive branch of
government. However, if it also receives extensive public funding, it may fall
within the doctrine of state action. Regents of University of California v. Bakke
(1978) 438 U.S. 265.
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right to housing, 7 3 with a constitutional dimension found not even
in the United States.
The deletion of property rights from section 7 of the Charter
makes comparison with the American provision of due process
74
difficult. Article 5 of The European Convention on Human Rights
does use the phrase "liberty and security of the person". However,
these words have been interpreted as referring to the physical liberty
and security of the person, rather than to matters of economic and
social security. 75 This conclusion is aided by the list of specific
guarantees of physical security encompassed within Article 5. There
is no such list in section 7 of the Charter, leaving its interpretation
even more open-ended. A broad interpretation of the affirmative
rights contained in section 7 is hampered by its appearance under
the "Legal Rights" segment of the Charter. This has led at least one
commentator to conclude that the section is concerned with physical
liberty, in the sense of freedom from confinement. 76 However,
another writer suggests that the liberty referred to is broad enough to
include even property rights. 77 It is more likely that the courts will
construe the meaning of liberty narrowly. Liberty was one of the
major vehicles for developing a doctrine of substantive due process
in the United States, but Canada's political traditions run counter to
this.
The phrase "security of the person" offers greater promise for an
expansive interpretation. 78 Canada's Law Reform Commission has
adopted the following broad definition: "Security of the person
73. M. Wheeler, ed., The Right to Housing (Montreal: Harvest House, 1969).
74. Reproduced in Tarnopolsky, W., and Beaudoin, G., Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms: Commentary (Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd., 1982) (Appendix

4) at 558.
75. Council of Europe, What is the Council of Europe doing to protect human
rights? (Strasbourg: Secretariat of Council of Europe, 1977) at 31. Property rights
and related economic rights are protected in the First Protocol to the Convention,
Article 1,cited, supra, note 74 at 561.
76. P. Garant, "Fundamental Freedoms and Natural Justice", in W. Tarnopolsky
and G. Beaudoin, CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms: Commentary, supra,

note 74 at 263-4.
77. McDonald, D., Legal Rights in the CanadianCharter of Rights and Freedoms

(Calgary: Carswell Co. Ltd., 1982) at 273. Such an interpretation runs counter to
the legislative intention to omit property rights from the Charter.
78. One early Charter case, R. v. Fisherman's Wharf (1982), 135 D.L.R. (3d) 307

(N.B.Q.B.), interpreted security of the person as including property. On appeal,
this decision was upheld without commenting on the lower court interpretation of
"security of the person" or the importation of property rights via s. 26 of the
Charter. Laforest J.A. wrote for the court in R. v. Fisherman'sWharf, (1982), 44
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means not only protection of one's physical integrity but the
provision of necessaries for its support." 7 9 Although this definition
was espoused in a medical context, the items necessary for support
can be viewed more broadly to include housing. 80 Indeed, shelter
has been recognized as one of the basic economic rights guaranteed
8
in Article 25 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. '
In the harsh North American climate, decent housing is one of the
necessities of life. In the United States, there is at least a statutory
recognition of the importance of housing, 8 2 but there are no such
statutory protections in Canada. It is also significant that the only
case which interpreted security of the person as including property
concerned more traditional property rights, and not claims to
83
government largesse.
In times of economic recession and restraint, there are Canadians
who are truly homeless and in a state of desperation. This is
particularly telling in relation to the poor and underprivileged, such
as the native Indians. Furthermore, the housing conditions tolerated
by single-parent welfare families are often shocking. People in such
conditions should be able to rely on the Charter without reducing its
credibility. 84 However, it is unlikely that courts would interpret
section 7 of the Charter as positively guaranteeing the right to
housing. Even if the courts took such an adventurist approach,
legislatures could exercise their section 33 rights under the Charter
and override section 7 with respect to the relevant housing
legislation. More likely, the courts themselves would limit the
application of "security of the person" by use of the reasonable
N.B.R. (2d) 201 (N.B.C.A.). For further elaboration of this issue, see C. J.
Brandt, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - Right to Property as an
Extension of Personal Security - Status of Undeclared Rights (1983), 61 Can. Bar

Rev. 398 (Special Charter Issue).
79. Medical Treatment and the Criminal Law, Working Paper No. 26 (Ottawa:
L.R.C.C., 1980) at 6.
80. M.L. Friedman, in Legal Rights Under the Charter (1981-82), 24 Crim. L.Q.
430 at 433, suggests that security of the person could affect the abortion rights
debate. This encompasses more than just medical health. An extension of the
concept of liberty was used in Roe v. Wade (1973) 410 U.S. 113, to permit women
to make their own decisions about abortions.
81. U.N. Doc. A/811, 1948.
82. The Federal Fair Housing Law, Title VIII. of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, Pub.
Law 90-284, codified at 42 U.S.C., sections 3601-3619 (1970, Supp, 1975).
83. R. v. Fisherman'sWharf, supra, note 78.
84. R. v. Altseimer (September 15, 1982), an unreported decision of Zuber J.A.

(Ont. C.A.) at 9. It warns against trivializing the Charter by pressing bizarre or
outlandish arguments.
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limits clause in section 1. The harsh reality is that it may be held
reasonable in the "free and democratic society" of Canada to
tolerate substandard housing.
(ii) Proceduralor Substantive Justice
However the courts define "life, liberty and security of the
person", there is a second branch of section 7 of the Charter which
guarantees that a person shall not be deprived of these rights except
in accordance with the principles of "fundamental justice". This
latter phrase was selected instead of the phrase "due process of
law", which was the language of section l(a) of the Bill of
Rights. 85 Commentators agree that the change of wording is
significant, but do not agree upon the nature of the significance.
Substantive due process is a concept which would allow the
courts to assess the fairness of a government program on its merits.
Procedural due process, on the other hand, is concerned with the
way in which a program is administered, but not its substance.
Furthermore, procedural protections normally attach when property
is taken away from an individual and not at the time of the initial
grant. A substantive due process interpretation would permit an
argument that the security of the person is violated when a person is
denied access to public housing, and not just when housing has been
provided and later removed. Such an approach would apply
concepts of fairness to those seeking housing, as well as those who
have had it removed or diminished in quality. Accordingly, the
debate about whether "fundamental justice" is procedural or
substantive is important. Commentators have come down on both
86
sides of this debate.
An obstacle to a substantive due process interpretation is the
decision of Laskin C.J. in Curr v. The Queen. 8 7 This case involved
the interpretation of the due process of law terminology in section
l(a) of the Bill of Rights. In the case, Laskin C.J. rejected an
argument for a substantive due process interpretation because it
85. R.S.C. 1970, Appendix Ill.
86. Minutes of Proceedingsand Evidence of Special Joint Committee of the Senate
and of the House of Commons on the Constitution of Canada, First Session of the

Thirty-Second Parliament, 1980-81, Issue 46, at 32 (January 27, 1981), cited in
Hogg, supra, note 66 at 29; supra, note 76; D. Mullan, "Human Rights and
Administrative Fairness", in R. Macdonald and J. Humphrey, The Practice of
Freedom (Toronto: Butterworths, 1979) at

[1972] S.C.R. 917 at 923.
87. [1972] S.C.R. 889.

it,

126; and Duke v. The Queen,
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would involve the courts in second-guessing the legislatures and
would, thus, run counter to the basic principle of the supremacy of
parliament. The views of the Chief Justice were, in part, premised
upon the fact that the Bill of Rights was not a constitutional
document. The Charter is a constitutional instrument which places
limits on legislative supremacy; nonetheless, there will be
considerable judicial resistence to substantive due process.
There have been a number of post-Charter cases which have
grappled with whether the "principles of fundamental justice" are
procedural or substantive. 88 While many lower courts have been
divided on his issue,8 9 indications are that a procedural view of
section 7 is likely to prevail. This is not to suggest that the section
will be impotent, for procedural rules often have a substantive
impact upon the merits of the decision. 90 Indeed, matters of
procedure shade into matters of substance. For example, an
unreasonable conclusion on the merits of a decision is often a sign
of unfair process and can be attacked on that basis. 9 1 Even by
adding a constitutional dimension to procedural rules, the result
may be substantively better decisions about the allocation of
housing. Furthermore, preoccupation with the new Charter should
not obscure the importance of evolving common law protections. A
constitution is an important, but not an exclusive, source of rights.
The doctrine of fairness, which will be discussed in the next
segment of this study, is a case in point. Indeed, Professor Mullan
suggests in a recent article that some cases have used fairness as a
88. R. v. Potma (1982), 67 C.C.C. (2d) 19 (Ont. H.C.), held that section 7 rights
were substantive; however, at the court of appeal level the procedural view
prevailed. R. v. Potma (January 14, 1983), an unreported decision (Ont. C.A.).
89. R. v. Cadedda (December 31, 1982), an unreported decision (Ont. S.C.); R.
v. Holman (July 15, 1982), an unreported decision (B.C. Prov. Ct.); and R. v.
Campagna (June 25, 1982), an unreported decision (B.C. Prov. Ct.) have all ruled
that the section is procedural. R. v. Roblin (May 28, 1982), an unreported decision
(Que. Ct. of Sess.) aff'd. (October 26, 1982), an unreported decision (Que. S.C.),
held that the rights in section 7 were substantive.
90. Nonet, P., Administrative Justice (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969)
at 3-7.
91. Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), 397 U.S. 254, is a case where a procedural attack
was successfully used to affect the actual distribution of welfare payments in New
York. However, there has been a retreat from this broad approach in Mathews v.
Eldridge (1970), 96 S.C.R. 893, a case which involved disability payments. A
useful exploration of the interconnection of procedure and substance is found in
R.L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the Relationship Between Fundamental Values and
ProceduralSafeguards in ConstitutionalRights to Hearing Cases (1979), 16 San
Diego L.R. 301.
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vehicle for imposing substantive, as well as procedural,
standards. 9 2 New standards of both a procedural and substantive
variety may also be imposed by regular statutes, as well as in
constitutional documents. The interesting American statutory
examples will be explored later.
(c) Equal Benefits andNondiscrimination

It is the equality rights guaranteed in section 15 of the Charter,
which hold out the best hope for a constitutionally protected right to
decent public housing. The signatories to the November Accord,
which set the political stage for the adoption of the Charter, agreed
that the protections of equality rights would only become effective
in 1985. 93 This delay was designed to give both the federal and
provincial governments the time to scrutinize their statute books in
light of the new constitutional standards and put their respective
houses in order. There was also a tacit understanding that section 15
could have a more drastic impact on the existing legal structure than
any other section of the Charter. 94 Accordingly, governments were
given three years to react.
The exact language of section 15 was altered at various stages in
the process of making the Constitution. In its final version, it
guarantees the following:
15(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has
the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law
without discrimination and, in particular without discrimination
based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age
or mental or physical disability.
(2) Subsection (1) does not preclude any law program or activity
that has as its object the amelioration of conditions of
disadvantaged individuals or groups including those that are
disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, colour,
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
By using the term "individual", the section probably excludes
corporations from the benefits of this provision. The use of many
phrases to define equality is a deliberate effort to escape the narrow
92. D. J. Mullan, Natural Justice and Fairness:Substantive as well as Procedural
standardsfor the Review of Administrative Decision-Making (1982), 27 McGill
L.J. 250.
93. Supra, note 5, at s. 32(2).
94. Hogg, supra, note 66 at 50, agrees that section 15 was delayed because it is
potentially so intrusive.
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judicial definitions of equality adopted by the Supreme Court of
Canada under the Bill of Rights. 9 5 In using the phrase "equal
protection" of the law, there appears to be an open invitation to
consider the American jurisprudence regarding the interpretation of
similar language in the Fourteenth Amendment. 96 In the past,
reference to the American Bill of Rights has not won favour in
Canadian courts. Indeed, section 15 goes beyond its American
counterpart in certain respects, containing as it does a long list of
expressly prohibited grounds of discrimination, the broad phrase
"equal benefit of the law", and justification of affirmative action
programs.
(i) Statutory or ConstitutionalProtections
A constitutional protection of public housing is a particularly
exciting possibility because the American experience suggests that
it is the only way to provide meaningful guarantees to the
low-income consumers of housing. 97 Statutory guarantees of fair
housing tend to be broadly stated and, thus, are easily overriden by
more specific government policies. America's Federal Fair Housing
Law provides a good example of this tendency. It states, as follows,
that: "It is the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States." 9 8 In the case law, the emphasis has been on the limitations,
rather than the protections.
Canada also has minimal guarantees of equal access to housing in
its human rights legislation at both the federal and provincial
levels. 99 Examples of legislative protection at the federal level are
the National Housing Loan Regulations10 0 and the Canada

95. A. G. Can. v. Lavell, [1974] S.C.R. 1349 and Bliss v. A. G. Can., [1979] 1
S.C.R. 183, are two examples of cases where very limited content was given to

sexual equality.
96. Hogg, supra, note 66 at 51.
97. K. L. Cambronne, Towards a Recognition of a Constitutional Right to
Housing (1972-74), 41-2 Univ. of Missouri Kansas City L.R. 363 and C. Reich,
supra, note 13.
98. Supra, note 82.

99. In May 1982, the Association of Nova Scotia Housing Authorities, which is
responsible for the administration of public housing in the province, made a formal
commitment to the principles of equal access to public housing. This was part of a
human rights affirmative action program.
100. Consolidation of Federal Regulations (1978), c. 1108, s. 53, pursuant to the
National Housing Act R.S.C. 1970, c. N-10.
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Assistance Plan. 1° 1 The problem with statutory limits on the
dispensers of housing is that they do not go far enough and can
easily be repealed. Housing in both Canada and the United States
has, in general, been classified as a privilege to be granted, and
sometimes even removed, as an act of grace. By a clever turn of
phrase in Re Webb, 102 subsidized public housing has been
designated a "benefit". However, it was a benefit which was only
protected at the removal stage and not at the time of initial
allocation. Moreover, the fairness protections in Re Webb had a
rather minimal procedural content.
Describing public housing as a benefit does provide a springboard
for lodging public housing within the constitutional protections of
section 15 of the Charter. The relevant phrase in this section is
"equal benefit of the law". If the argument for expanding the
legally protected interest at this stage in Canadian legal evolution is
accepted, then public housing acquires the status of a constitutional
right. An advantage of such an argument is the newness of the
Charter, in that it has not yet acquired judicial baggage which would
limit constitutional protections to traditionally accepted rights, such
03
as the right to private property. '
(ii) Defining Equality in Housing
Bringing housing within section 15 of the Charter would not ensure
full protection or fairness in the broad sense. Indeed, the question of
what is a fair allocation of public housing may not be appropriate for
courts to answer at all. What constitutes a fair or equal distribution
101. R.S.C. 1970, c. C-I. This act begins as follows:

Whereas the Parliament of Canada, recognizing that the provision of adequate
assistance to and in respect of persons in need and the prevention and removal of
the causes of poverty and dependence on public assistance are the concern of all
Canadians, is desirous of encouraging the further development and extension of
assistance and welfare services programs throughout Canada by sharing more
fully with the provinces in the cost thereof; Therefore, Her Majesty, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Commons of Canada, enacts
as follows...

Under section 2 of this act, "assistance" is defined to include shelter. However,
because the implementing provinces bring differing financial resources to the task,
the goal of equal assistance to all Canadians is frustrated.
102. Supra, note 12.

103. American commentators who have advocated making housing a constitutional right had to propose expanded definitions of property which the courts were
reluctant to accept; supra, note 97. At this stage, Canada does not face this hurdle.
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of goods is, at base, a value question which is as dependent on
ideology and politics as it is on either economics or law. The
complexity of problems concerning the original allocation of public
housing has led courts to focus upon the more limited problems
related to post facto removal of housing. Courts can go beyond their
prior role, but they will not define what allocation of public housing
is fair. Indeed, there have been many different interpretations of the
104
concept of equality.
It is important to have realistic expectations of the Charter of
Rights and what it can do. The more modest role of providing a fair
legal framework for political decisions and guaranteeing a genuine
input into the process should be the judicial objective. In doing this,
courts can also invalidate allocations of resources that are clearly
unfair or which discriminate in ways expressly or implicitly
prohibited in section 15.
(iii) Housing Equality: The American Experience
Professor Walter Tarnopolsky 105 predicts that the American
approach to equality problems will be instructive for interpreting
section 15 of the Charter. Three levels of judicial scrutiny have been
applied to legislation in the United States, depending upon the
classification of the rights affected. The first and most searching
level of scrutiny is applied to laws which discriminate on the basis
of inherently suspect categories. Examples are race, religion, and
nationality. Such laws can only be justified if there is a compelling
state interest which cannot be achieved without such discrimination.
This same criterion should be applied to the expressly forbidden
grounds of discrimination enumerated in section 15 of the Charter.
Thus, if public housing were denied on the basis of race,
nationality, religion, or sex, there would be a clear violation of
section 15, which could only be justified under section 1 of the
104. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution, 3rd ed. (London: University of
London Press, 1943), cited in W. Tarnopolsky, "The Equality Rights", in W.
Tarnopolsky and G. Beaudoin, Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms:
Commentary (Toronto: Carswell Company Ltd., 1982) at 401. In many respects,
the only way to give a disadvantaged person real equality of opportunity, is to
provide preferential treatment; Dworkin, R., Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1979) at 273. Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke (1978) 438 U.S. 265.
105. W. Tarnopolsky, "The Equality Rights", in W. Tarnopolsky and G.
Beaudoin, Canadian Charterof Rights and Freedoms: Commentary, supra, note
104 at 401-7.
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Charter in the most extreme circumstances, if at all. Professor Hogg
argues that the inclusion of "age" and "mental or physical
disability" in the Canadian list of enumerated prohibitions does not
necessarily elevate them to the inherently suspect category. 10 6 It is
more likely that discrimination based on these facts would fall into a
lower level of scrutiny.
At the second level of intermediate scrutiny, laws must serve
important governmental objectives and be substantially related to
those aims in order to meet the constitutional test. This analysis has
frequently been applied to sex discrimination in the United States;
however, the general advances of the women's movement and the
special prohibition against gender discrimination in section 28 of the
Charter make sex a likely candidate for strict scrutiny. This is
important in the context of housing, as single-parent families
headed by women are among those most in need of public housing.
And, finally, there is the minimal scrutiny test, which, in the United
States, has been applied where there is neither an invasion of the
inherently suspect categories nor of basic constitutional rights. This
level of review tends to be used for legislative classifications based
upon economic and social factors. Public housing could easily fall
within this category of minimal protection, yet such a categorization
would be unfortunate because, as Tarnopolsky indicates, it is much
easier for the state to justify cases of discrimination in this last
category.10 7 In addition, scrutiny based on this test would be little
improvement over the narrow protections provided by the Bill of
Rights. Under this statute, laws which are enacted for the purpose of
achieving a valid federal objective do not violate the guarantees of
equality in the Bill of Rights.' 0 8 Such enactments would now have
to meet a constitutional, as opposed to a statutory, standard of
equality, but the criteria identified by McIntyre J. in MacKay v. The
Queen will no doubt be considered. ' 0 9
Public housing in the United States has, in general not been
viewed as a basic constitutional right; 110 thus, judicial review of
laws related to housing has been carried out on the minimal scrutiny
106. Supra, note 66 at 51.
107. Supra, note 105 at 405.
108. MacKay v. The Queen, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 370.
109. Ibid, at 407.

110. The New Jersey Supreme Court regarded public housing as being akin to a
constitutional right, in that it was vital to the general welfare. Southern Burlington
County N.A.A.C.P. v. Mount Laurel (1975) 336 A. (2d) 713.
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level.1 1 1 In spite of arguments which hold that housing is of
fundamental importance, Mr. Justice White, speaking for the
majority in Lindsey v. Normet, expressed the American judicial
view, as follows:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary
housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies
for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in
that document any constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings
of a particular quality, or any recognition of the right of a tenant
to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his
lease without the payment of rent or otherwise contrary to the
terms of the relevant agreement. Absent constitutional mandate,
the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of
landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial
functions . . . since the classifications under attack is rationally
related to that purpose, the statute is not repugnant to the Equal
12
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 1
In one of the few Canadian cases dealing with public housing,
Winnipeg Regional Housing Authority v. Woloshen, 113 a landlord
succeeded in getting an eviction order against a tenant who was
habitually late with her rental payments. The majority of the court
held that being financially destitute and paying other bills, such as
car and bank loans, was not a reasonable excuse for late payment of
rent. Thus, the judicial view of public housing as a privilege, rather
than a right, may well prevail in Canada as well. However, Mr.
Justice Huband dissented in the Woloshen case. He was sympathetic
to the fact that one of the single-mother's large debts was incurred
as the result of an amorous fling with an Edmonton man who did not
indemnify her for expenses, as promised. Huband J.A. made the
following comment, which offers some hope for the inhabitants of
low-income public housing:
In the course of argument, counsel for the landlord argued that
the tenant's poverty cannot be proferred as an excuse for late
payments. It was argued that there cannot be a double standard
for deciding what constitutes justifiable or reasonable cause.
In my opinion, the issue of justifiable or reasonable cause must
be decided according to the circumstances of each individual
case. The economic circumstances of the tenant may well
constitute circumstances which would justify a late payment.
111. Lindsey v. Normet (1972), 405 U.S. 56 and Village of Arlington Heights v.
MetropolitanHousing and Development Corporation(1977) 429 U.S. 252.
112. (1972), 405 U.S. 56 at 74.
113. (1982), 16 Man. R. (2d) 344 (Man. C.A.).
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Where a tenant has substantial savings in a bank account, it
would not constitute justifiable or reasonable cause for such a
tenant to say that his cheque for wages had been dishonoured, or
his unemployment insurance cheque had not come through, or he
had not been reimbursed for the cost of a trip to Edmonton. But
for one who has no other resources these unexpected turns and
a justifiable or reasonable cause for
twists of fate can constitute
14
late payment of rent. 1
While section 15 of the Charter offers promise, much depends
upon whether public housing will be considered a basic right,
deserving of a high level of constitutional scrutiny. A heavy burden
rests upon lawyers in the early cases to convince judges that the
American classification of public housing rights is wrong, or at least
outdated. These lawyers will be assisted in their task if public
housing is regarded as a basic right in the larger society. When all is
said and done, courts can do little more than provide a framework
for giving effect to the value judgments of the larger society. Thus,
law can promote fairness in public housing, but cannot create it.
(d) ConstitutionalRemedies
It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the nuances of the
remedial sections of the Charter of Rights. Commentators have
already addressed remedial problems, 115 and this aspect of the
Charter will undoubtedly spawn more scholarly writing as the new
law develops. Suffice it to say that the remedies offer an invitation
to judicial creativity. Once again, the United States offers guidance.
In Hills v. Gautreaux,1I the United States Supreme Court applied
the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent federal funding of a housing
authority which engaged in discriminatory practices. The lines have
also been blurred between public and private action in the United
States, as private discrimination at a state level has been indirectly
forbidden. 117
One of the many questions about the Charter which remains to be
answered is whether or not its remedies will be accessible to the
poor and disadvantaged members of society, whose rights are most
114. Ibid, at 349-50.
115. One example is E. G. Ewaschuk, The Charter: An Overview of Remedies
(1982), 26 C.R. (3d) 54.
116. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
117. Reitman v. Mulkey (1967) 387 U.S. 369 and C. Black, Foreward: "State
Action", Equal Protection and California'sProposition14 (1967-8), 81 Harv. L.
R. 69.
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likely to be violated. For example, many inhabitants of public
housing would not be informed of their constitutional rights or, even
if they were, could not afford lawyers to take their cases. Unless
legal aid is implicitly guaranteed by the Charter, there is no
assurance that low-income people will have access to legal counsel,
without which the remedies provided in the Charter are not equally
available to all.
Questions of legal standing raise further problems of access to the
courts. Standing is particularly problematic in relation to public
housing because eligibility criteria for public housing and
discriminatory practices in relation to such housing can be disguised
to prevent the interested party from having an identifiable interest.
Are the rights of a person who has applied for public housing, but
has not yet been accepted, violated by the adoption of
discriminatory criteria? Does the violation only arise when the
guideline is applied or is a person only adversely affected when
existing property is removed? The language of section 24(1) of the
Charter suggests its own standing requirement: only when rights
"have been infringed" can a person apply to the courts. This does
not really resolve the problem, as the rights of a prospective public
housing tenant may be violated by the adoption of discriminatory
criteria. However, even if this broader approach is taken, there must
be a violation of a Charter right, and not just any unfair act. Timing
and judgment will be important in using section 24 of the Charter. If
a statutory provision is being challenged pursuant to section 52 of
the Constitution Act, 1982, the normal rules for standing in
constitutional cases apply; 118 specifically, the person seeking the
remedy must have an affected interest. 119 Standing has had a
proprietory flavour and the United States cases on discriminatory
zoning illustrate this. Zoning laws were regularly used to exclude
people of low income or minority status from certain designated
housing areas. In Warth v. Seldin, 120 the United States Supreme
court denied the plaintiffs standing because they could not point to
118. Thorson v. A. G. Can. (1974), 43 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.); N.S. Board of
Censors v. McNeil (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 632 (S.C.C.), and Min. of Justice
(Can.) v. Borowski, [1982] 1 W.W.R. 97 (S.C.C.).
119. Finlay v. Minister of Finance and Minister of Health and Welfare (April 25,
1983), an unreported decision (F.C.A.), which held that a Manitoban social
assistance claimant had standing to challenge payments allegedly below the
requirement of federal law.
120. (1975) 422 U.S. 490.
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existing or planned housing developments on the zoned lands from
which they had been excluded. 12 1 The entire point of the zoning
was to exclude such housing projects in the first place.
The chances are that remedies will be provided more readily at
the stage of housing removal than at the time of the initial grant.
One device to ensure this traditional approach is standing. There is a
potential for innovative remedies both within the language of
section 24(1) of the Charter and the invitation to affirmative action
in section 15(2). However, the would-be recipient of public housing
would be well-advised to educate the general public about the
importance of housing and not expect the courts to be educated, or
to educate on, this matter.
VI. Fairness:Proceduraland Substantive Review Standards
In legal terms, fairness is a doctrine concerned primarily with
procedures. Like much of our common law heritage, it is British in
origin. It is important to note that it has been a procedural doctrine,
and not a substantive one. It is hoped that a decision made by
following fair procedures will be a substantively better decision.
This link has not been expanded into a doctrine of substantive due
process, as has developed in the United States; however, there are
signs that the line between procedural and substantive review has
122
recently been blurred by a broad interpretation of fairness.
Procedures are still the main focus, but there is a new policy role for
the courts which allows them to consider, at least indirectly, the
merits of a decision - formerly a matter exclusively within the
legislative domain. 123 The evolution of the concept of fairness from
the doctrines of natural justice has already been examined and shall
1 24
not be repeated here.
The difficulty of separating matters of procedure and substance
has already been emphasized by the discussion about the
constitutional right to fundamental justice. This same problem
resurfaces in regard to the interpretation of the common law concept
of fairness. Whether fairness will remain true to its procedural roots
121. However, Mount Laurel, supra, note 110, imposed a duty to provide an
opportunity for low- and moderate-income housing.
122. Supra, note 92.
123. M. Loughlin, ProceduralFairness: A Study of the Crisis in Administrative
Law Theory (1978), 28 U. of T.L.J. 215.
124. Ibid, and D. J. Mullan, Fairness:The New NaturalJustice (1975), 25 U. of
T.L.J. 281.
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in natural justice or expand into substantive review is not clear at
present. Further confusion is added by the evolution of the
traditional grounds for substantive review of administrative
decisions under the umbrella of abuse of discretion. Agreement is
also lacking as to whether increased judicial review is desirable or,
if desirable, whether it should proceed under the banner of fairness.
(a) Substantive Content to Fairness
There has been an increasing awareness that procedure and
substance are really points on a single continuum, and not
completely distinct ideas. Professor Grey argues that this has been
the core of recent developments in administrative law.' 25 Professor
Mullan agrees that there are signs of a substantive extension of
fairness, but is more inclined to view this as heresay, rather than
orthodoxy. 126 To date, few cases in Canada have adopted the
substantive view of fairness and thereby challenged the merits of an
administrative decision. 12 7 This may reflect a more traditional view
of the role of the judge in the administrative process. Such a view is
well expressed in the following quotation:
However, judges are not supposed to base their decisions on
arguments of policy, that is, on what will promote desirable
social goals, be they comfort for the sick, shelter for the
homeless, education for children, mitigation of industrial unrest,
or - and this is the major problem - the equitable assessment of
priorities in the use of limited resources. Judges must reach their
decisions by reasoning from the established rules, resolving
difficult questions by reference to principles of law rather than

social aims. ..

128

(b) The Exercise and Review of Housing Discretion
Administrative discretion is a vital aspect of modern government.
The proper approach for a lawyer to take is not to decry its
existence, but to devise the best means for taming it. 12 9 This
125. J. H. Grey, Can Fairnessbe Effective (1982), 27 McGill L. J. 360 at 370.
126. Supra, note 92.
127. Trans West Development Ltd. v. Nanaimo (1979), 11 M.P.L.R. 254
(B.C.S.C.), was the only one located by D.J. Mullan, supra, note 92. Mullan feels
that Canada is achieving the same result by reviewing decisions on the grounds of
inconsistency.
128. Editorial:Rights or Rationing (1978-79), Journal of Social Welfare Law 193
at 193.
129. Davis, K.C., Discretionary Justice (Batton Rouge: Louisianna State
University Press, 1969).
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constructive approach is even more important in the Canadian than
in the American context. In the Anglo-Canadian tradition, statutes
are skeletal in nature, leaving it to front-line administrators to flesh
out the legislative intent. l3 0 By contrast, the American tradition is
to enact detailed statutes which often encompass extensive
guidelines to assist the administrators. This difference in legislative
drafting is likely a reflection of the differing perceptions of
government in the two countries. America was born out of a distrust
of government, which extended to bureaucrats as well as to
legislators; Canada, in the British tradition, is more likely to trust
13
her civil servants. 1
(i) StructuringDiscretion

Discretionary government authority over housing has mushroomed
since World War II, when the federal government made its presence
felt on the Canadian scene. The exercise of discretion in the housing
field is vital to the fairness of the resulting allocation of public
housing. Fair decisions must be made at the front lines and on the
administrative level, so that the person claiming the benefits of
public housing can avoid the costs and uncertainty of seeking a
remedy for abuse of discretion in either the political or judicial
arenas. A focus on the advance structuring of discretion, as opposed
to the limiting of it in a post facto fashion by way of external judicial
restraints, promotes this. Traditionally, law has been used as a tool
for confining administrative decision-makers to their statutory
jurisdiction, leaving agencies free to exercise their power within the
32
protected sphere of jurisdiction.1
In his treatise Administrative Justice, Philippe Nonet captures the
excitement of focusing legal attention upon preventing abuse of
discretion at the first level, rather than pursuing post facto review in
the courts. He also underscores the connection between procedures,
broadly defined, and the substantive fairness of the administrative
decision:
At issue here is the very meaning of legal procedure. Procedure is
not primarily a way of confining government within the limits of
rules. Instead, it is seen as a structure of opportunities for
participation and criticism, allowing affected persons to
130. Fish, supra, note 23 at 209.
131. J. Wills, The McRuer Report: Lawyers' Values and Civil Servants' Values
(1968), 18 U. of T.L.J. 351.
132. Supra, note 90 at 3-7.
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challenge and influence official policy. In this perspective, the
function of legal criticism is less to reduce the role of government
than to use and develop the resources governmental policy offers
33
for promoting individual and group interests in public welfare. 1
13 4
To be effective, this structuring process must be an open one.
Bureaucrats are rarely neutral in the implementation of government
policy. Yet a lack of neutrality does not imply sinister
representation of vested interests; it may be explained by a personal
choice between conflicting government policies. Susan Fish
provides an interesting example of this by exploring the low-income
housing program instituted under section 15 of the NHA. 13 5 The
building of these units was directed more towards promoting profits
for the developers than meeting the real housing needs of the poor.
Furthermore, once the public housing units were built, their
36
management was neglected. 1
The structuring of discretion is still in its infancy in Canada and
there are still problems, as will be discussed in the examination of
the Halifax Housing Authority. However, the making of broad
policy is only one aspect of exercise of discretion. The application
of these rules to each individual case is a more frequent activity.
Even when proper procedures are followed, abuse can result,
requiring substantive review in the courts. The traditional grounds
of substantive review for abuse of discretion are well articulated in
the late Professor de Smith's classic book, Judicial Review of
Administrative Action. 137 When all else fails, it is possible to lobby
the relevant political authorities. Unfortunately, the recipients of
public housing rarely possess political clout.
VII. Case Studies in Housing Allocation

Before considering Canadian agencies, it will be useful to briefly
examine developments in the United States and England in regard to
housing allocation. The historical roots of Canada's law regarding
procedural protections and abuse of discretion are found in the
United Kingdom. America's constitutional protections of equality
133. Ibid, at 6-7.
134. Supra, note 129. K.C. Davis stresses that openness is the natural enemy of

arbitrary and abusive discretion.
135. R.S.C. 1970, c.N-10.
136. Fish, supra, note 23 at 211-4.
137. de Smith, S., Judicial Review of Administrative Action: 4th ed. J. Evans
(Toronto: Carswell Co. Ltd., 1980) at 278-357.
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and due process have been considered as a guide to the
interpretation of the Charter. However, the United States has also
addressed housing problems in statutory form. These statutes may
also provide guidance for the future.
(a) United States: The JudicialModel
Americans appear to be much less trusting of their housing officials
than Canadians are of theirs. This is reflected by the onerous
procedural requirements imposed upon housing authorities in the
United States. 138 Some commentators argue that over-judicializing
the allocation of housing has been counterproductive for all
concerned. 13 9 The efficiency of the housing authorities has been
thwarted by the requirement of full evidentiary hearings. This is a
particular problem for large city agencies, which received many
applications for public housing. 140 Legal decisions about housing
are frequently made without serious consideration of the economic
consequences that may follow.141
Guidelines for determining who is eligible for public housing
have been challenged in the courts. The existence of a record of rent
arrears and the possession of a criminal record were not sufficient
grounds to deny eligibility for public housing. 14 2 Rejections on
these grounds were invalidated, not because the rules themselves
were unreasonable, but because the applicants were denied a fair
hearing. A federal district court in Thomas v. Housing Authority of
Little Rock 143 threw out a housing authority rule which denied
access to unwed mothers. This rule was considered patently unfair
because it was based on the assumption that unwed mothers were
promiscuous. While the latter rule is offensive and probably
138. J. S. Fuerst and R. Petty, Public Housing in the Courts: Pyrrhic Victoriesfor
the Poor (1977), 9 Urban Lawyer 496 at 498.

139. Ibid.
140. Sampler v. White Plains Housing Authority (1972) 278 N.E. 2d. 892, is a

case where the court held that requiring the New York City Housing Authority to
give a full hearing to each of the 9,411 applicants it rejected that year was too
burdensome.
141. This is one of the major themes which emerges from a series of papers
delivered at the Liberty Fund Inc. Seminar on "The Common Law History of
Landlord-Tenant Law", Law and Economics Center, Emory University, Atlanta,
Georgia, March 11-13, 1983.
142. For the first example, see Neddo v. Housing Authority of Milwaukee 335 F.
Supp. 1397 (E.D. Wis., 1971), and, for the latter example, see Mamgo v. New
York City Housing Authority (S.Ct., 1966) 273 N.Y.S. 2d 1003.
143. (E.D. Ark., 1967) 282 F. Supp. 575.
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justifies court intervention, the general suspicion of guidelines casts
44
a wet blanket on the desirable process of structuring discretion. 1 It
is also significant that guidelines for eligibility are intended to limit
hearings and, so long as they are relevant and reasonable, should be
allowed to do so.
Eviction from public housing has attracted more extensive
procedural safeguards than has the imitial grant of housing. This is
consistent with the distinction in Re Webb 145 between acquired
benefits and those which have only been sought. Procedural
protections at the removal stage in the United States are part of the
price that state and local authorities must pay for federal housing
assistance. There has been no such federal imposition at the initial
grant of housing.
In 1971, several court cases contended that state housing
authorities were not following constitutional due process. In
response, the department of Housing and Urban Development
(hereafter "HUD") issued two circulars requiring those who
received federal assistance to recognize certain rights. 146 Some of
the required protections included termination of tenancy only on
good cause, reasons for eviction at a private conference, subsequent
hearings, notice of rules of the hearing, an impartial board, rights to
counsel, cross examination, and a right to a written decision
disposing of the case. Furthermore, the HUD circulars were
sometimes applied in lieu of the constitutional due process
protections. In Thomas v. Housing Authority of the City of Durham,
which involved a federally assisted public housing project, a tenant
was given a fifteen-day eviction notice the day after he became
president of the tenants' association. 147 Focusing upon the lack of
reasons for the eviction, the United States Supreme Court held that a
tenant could not be evicted for engaging in a constitutionally
protected activity, such as freedom of association. Again, there are
some costs to such procedural protections. It may take considerable
144. There are many states which impose no procedural requirements at the
eligibility level. Federal funding is not conditional on provision of fair procedures
at the initial grant of public housing. No attempt has been made to fully canvass the
American position on eligibility criteria for housing and the cases were selected for
their instructive, rather than representative, value.
145. Supra, note 12.
146. The full text of these circulars, numbers 7465.8 and 7465.9, is contained in
Omaha v. U.S. HousingAuthority (1972) 468 F. 2d 1. This case held that the HUD
circulars were not an invasion of local housing jurisdiction.
147. (1969) 383 U.S. 268.
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time to evict an undesirable tenant who, during the course of the
required hearings, may inconvenience or disrupt the rest of the
tenants. Housing Authority of Milwaukee v. Moseby is a case in
point. 148 The tenant was being evicted for bad housekeeping, which
had deteriorated to the extent that it was detrimental to his
neighbours. After three years of hearings, the court was finally able
to evict the tenant.
There is no denying the importance of an eviction from public
housing, and some fair procedures should accompany such a
decision. However, in setting the content of the hearings, attention
should be given to the hardship caused to the rest of the tenants by
the continued presence of the alleged rule violator.' 49 The
flexibility of common law concepts of natural justice and fairness is
attractive in this respect. Canada, in developing her approach to
fairness in housing, should consider whether the person applying for
public housing should be denied the protections afforded to a person
who is evicted from the same housing. The American due process
clause is anchored in property rights, while the equivalent section in
Canada's Charter is not. This may allow greater flexibility in
extending the range of protected interests by both constitutional and
statutory means.
(b) England: CurialDeference andAdministrative Checks
A different model for controlling the fair distribution of public
housing is found in England. It is not a judicialized model, but an
administrative check on maladministration in housing at the local
level. Public housing forms a large portion of the housing market in
Britain, unlike in the United States, where private housing
maintains a clear dominance.' 50 Local housing authorities are a
major provider of increasingly scarce public housing units and they
exercise a very broad discretion in both the allocation and transfer of
public housing. However, the Commission for Local Administration in England has the power to investigate complaints of

148. 192N.W. 2d. 913 (Wis., 1972).
149. Supra, note 138 at 504.
150. Note the statistics on the percentage of public housing cited in the
Introduction to this paper, and the update on these statistics in Cullingworth, supra,
note 8 at 9.
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administrative abuse and to publish reports of their findings.' 5 ' In
the Housing Act,

1957,152 local authorities are given a broad

discretion over the "management, regulation and control" of
houses. There is a requirement that "reasonable preference" be
given to tenants who occupy unsanitary houses, live in overcrowded
conditions, or have large families. 153 There is also a duty to provide
housing for people who have been displaced from their residences
as a result of a demolition or closing order.' 5 4 Local authorities are
directed to give preference to the homeless in accordance with the
Housing (Homeless Persons) Act 1977.155 Within these broad
statutory parameters, there is room for discretion.
Most local authorities in England have established eligibility
criteria to guide and structure their discretion in the processes of
allocation and of transfer. D. J. Hughes and S. R. Jones suggest that
these distribution schemes fall into four main groups - "date
order" schemes, "point" schemes, "merit"
schemes, and
''combined" schemes. 156 Government has insisted that these
schemes be simple and public so that the affected tenants can
become aware of the rules which determine their housing claims.
A review of reported complaints made to the Commission on
Local Administration from 1977 to 1979 provides clear examples of
abuse of housing discretion. 157 Local ward councillors are given
considerable input into the issuing of public housing, which gives
rise to favouritism and political bias and also could give rise to
problems of dictation. 158 In some cases, moral views about
marriage break-ups, common-law arrangements, and proper
conduct were considered, and local hearsay about a particular
housing claimant can be quite damaging. In one colourful case, a
family was denied public housing because there were doubts that the
parents were properly married and because the local characterization of the family was as a "rum mixture". 159
151. D.J. Hughes and S.R. Jones, Bias in the Allocation and Transfer of Local
Authority Housing: A Study of the Reports of the Commission for Local
Administration in England (1978-79) Journal of Social Welfare Law 273.
152. (U.K.), 5&6Eliz. 2, atc. 56, s. 111.
153. Ibid, at s. 113.
154. Land Compensation Act, 1973, (U.K.), 1964, c. 26, s. 39.

155. (U.K.), 1977, c. 48, s. 4.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Supra, note 151 at 275.
Supra, note 151 at 279-92.
Roncarelli v. Duplessis, [ 1959] S.C.R. 121.
Supra, note 151 at 282-4.
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British courts can intervene through judicial review for abuse of
discretion. However, the onus of proof is on the tenant and
allegations of abuse of discretion are very difficult to prove. 160 This
is accentuated by the general absence of written reasons. The few
housing cases which have reached the courts demonstrate an attitude
of deference to the front-line housing authorities. R. v. Bristol
Corporation, ex parte Hendy' 6 ' was a case where the court agreed
with the local authority that a person displaced as the result of a
closing order need not be given preference over other claimants on
the general waiting list. The philosophy of deference was well
articulated by Lawton L.J. in Bristol District Council v. Clark, as
follows: 1 62 ". . .this court should be most reluctant to interfere
with the exercise of Housing Act powers by a local authority. Local
authorities have to meet the electors from time to time. The electors
are in a far better position than the court could ever be to decide
whether the powers have been exercised in a way which meets with
general approval.' '163
The fact that British courts are deferential to the front-line
housing administrators does not mean that the latter institutional
mechanism is ideal. Indeed, a proper policy analysis should
consider the comparative virtues and vices of the various
institutional mechanisms available.' 64 Some of the weaknesses of
the English bureaucratic approach to housing are exemplified by the
controversial "housing allowance" scheme which was introduced
by the Conservatives in 1972. These allowances were designed to
ensure that the rents charged in both the private and public sectors
would be assessed on a fair basis. More specifically, these
allowances, in the form of rental subsidies tied to family income,

160. D. Hoath, Council Tenants complaints and the Local Ombudsman (1978),
128 New L.J. 672.
161. [1974] AlIE.R. 1047(C.A.).
162. [l975]3AIIE.R.976(C.A.)at98l.
163. Ibid. cited in Hughes and Jones, supra, note 151 at 275. For further
elaboration of this point, see D.J. Hughes, Municipal Eviction (1977), 127 New
L.J. 1067.
164. N. K. Komesar, In Search of a General Approach to Legal Analysis: A
Comparative Institutional Alternative (1981), 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1350. This view
has been elaborated on by Komesar in "The Revolution in Landlord-Tenant Law:
A Comparative Institutional View", a paper prepared for Liberty Fund Inc.
Seminar on the Common Law History of Landlord-Tenant Law, held in Law and
Economics Center, Emory University, Atlanta, Georgia, during March 11-13,
1983.
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were intended to assist the poorer tenants to acquire decent
165
housing.
There were significant problems with the administration of the
166
housing allowance scheme even in the early days of the program.
David Yates wrote an informative article in which he assessed both
the potential of housing allowances and the practical problems of
implementing them.167 The complexity of the program is identified
as one of the major difficulties, especially in light of the generally
low literacy rate of the potential claimants. Many of the claimants
had a pessimistic view of welfare agencies and did not know where
to seek assistance in untangling the complicated application
process. Tenants were also reluctant to seek out the rental officer for
purposes of lowering their rents, because they feared that their
landlord would be even less willing to make needed repairs than was
presently the case. In short, there was a significant communication
gap between the administrators and the potential claimants. Finally,
one of the most despised features of the application process was the
means test. The housing means tests placed a heavier burden on the
claimant to prove the level of both his income and his rent than was
the case with other programs. Often, the documentation needed in
such a claim was either lost or never provided by the landlord. The
68
fairness of the means tests themselves has also been questioned. 1
(c) Canada:Agencies in Search of a Model
The United States and England offer Canada very different models
for dispute resolution. The American courts are considered the
major avenue of redress in that country and, with the arrival of the
Charter and given the resulting higher profile for Canadian courts,
the judicial model has an increased appeal in Canada. However, the
British model of a court which is deferential to administrative
decisions is more in line with the Canadian tradition. Using an
administrative device, such as a commission or ombudsman for
165. The complex statutory scheme for housing allowances is outlined in the
Housing Finance Act 1972 (U.K.), 1972, c. 47, ss. 62-70 (now repealed) and Rent
Act 1977, (U.K.), 1977, c. 42, s. 70.
166. Research conducted under the auspices of the American Urban Institute in
Washington, D.C., canvassed some of these problems in comparison with
American housing programs. 0. Hetzel, D. Yates, and J. Trutko, Making
Allowances for Housing Costs (1978), 1 Urban Law and Policy 229.
167. D. Yates, Rent Allowances -Six Years On (1978), Journal of Social Welfare

Law 195.
168. Ibid, at 214.
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housing, is also a reform worthy of consideration. Before turning to
models of reform, however, it is time to consider the existing state
of housing allocation in Canada. This front-line analysis will take
the form of case studies of two particular housing agencies.
(i) Rent Review Agencies

Rent control has been the focus of the research and writing that has
been done on the issue of housing. Economists have been foremost
in dissecting rent control schemes. 16 9 Less attention has been given
to rent control in legal circles, but the topic has not escaped
mention. 170 Instituting, or at least not withdrawing from, a program
of rent controls is politically attractive because of the voting power
of tenants. Thus, attacks by economists have gone largely
unnoticed. J.B. Cullingworth expresses it well, saying that: "Since
rent control is such an attractive policy to governments, and so
contrary to economic theories, it is difficult to think of any other
issue on which the dictates of economic and political theory so
clearly clash." 171
Rent control causes confusion, as it is commonly used to describe
significantly different degrees of interference in the housing
market. 172 At one end of the scale is a rent freeze, which allows
little or no change in rents. This was effectively the form of rent
control imposed in Canada during World War II. At the other end of
the scale is rent review, which allows costs to be passed on fully to
tenants. This process usually includes allowances for a "reasonable" return on investment, often based on returns available in other
segments of the financial market. Such a rent review process would
allow increases in rents, based on rising interest rates in other parts
of the economy, even if no significant changes were occurring in the
housing market itself. In the debate over rent control, its opponents
tend to argue as if all controls were, in fact, rent freezes. Dire
predictions of deteriorating rental housing stock and increasing
scarcity of rental units due to a lack of incentive for investment
169. Two examples are: Patterson, J. and Watson, K., Rent Stabilization: A
Review of Current Policies in Canada (Toronto: Canadian Council on Social
Development, 1976), and Hoyek, F.A., Rent Control: A Popular Paradox Evidence on the Economic Effects of Rent Control (Vancouver: Fraser Institute,

1976).
170. D. Owen, Rent Controls:Solution or Problem (1977), 41 Sask. L. Rev. 3.
171. Cullingworth, supra, note 8 at 46.
172. See J. Patterson and K. Watson, supra. note 169.
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invariably form part of the debate. The proponents of rent control
focus on the system of rent review, which does little to effectively
control rents in times of rapidly increasing prices and interest
rates. 173 The opponents of rent control demand that controls be
abolished in order to avoid further disruption of the housing market,
while the proponents argue that more control is needed to protect
tenants in a volatile market.
It is necessary to first determine the degree of control in each
locality so that the emotionalism surrounding rent control may be
tempered with reality. For the purposes of this paper, the term "rent
review" will be used to describe all forms of rent control other than
rent freezes, recognizing that considerable latitude exists within the
rent review process itself. It should not, however, be assumed that
rent review is necessarily favourable to the tenant. The broad
administrative discretion given to the relevant review agencies
produces a mechanism which can be used to keep landlords happy
as well. Couple this with the reluctance of tenants to trigger the rent
review process for fear of landlord reprisals, and the pro-tenant
character of rent control diminishes. Because tenants in Nova Scotia
and, to a lesser extent, in other parts of Canada lack security of
17 4
tenure, they are in an unequal bargaining position with landlords.
To the extent that rent review does benefit tenants, it is more likely
to do so in the middle- and upper-income ranges. Litigation, either
by these middle-income tenants or the landlords, has improved the
procedural structure of rent review agencies.' 75 In Ontario, public
housing tenants were exempted from rent review protections in
76
1976, emphasizing the unequal status of lower-income tenants.'
In Nova Scotia, rent review appears to apply to public, as well as
private, "residential premises". This latter term is defined broadly

173. Cullingworth, supra, note 8 at 46-50. There is little solid empirical evidence

on the economic impact of rent review.
174. Supra, note 6 at 61. Canada's tradition has been closer to the American
model than the British, as most Canadian legislation does not ensure security of
tenancy.
175. Re Scott et al v. Rent Review Commission (1977),

81 D.L.R. (3d) 530

(N.S.C.A.). It is noteworthy that this case was argued by Dalhousie Legal Aid, but
only after there was a heated debate at the board level about whether it was a proper
case for the Legal Aid Clinic. Some of the tenants earned incomes in excess of the
eligibility criteria for service at the clinic.
176. Residential Premises Rent Review Amendment Act, S.O. 1976 (2nd. Sess.),
c. 36, s. 5(1).
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in section 4 of Nova Scotia's Rent Review Act.17 7 However, in
practice, government-owned public housing is exempted from the
78
rent review process in Nova Scotia, as well as in Ontario.1
The income range of the clientele of the Rent Review
Commission is much broader than that of the Halifax Housing
Authority, which will be examined in the next segment of this
paper. By definition, this latter agency deals exclusively with
low-income tenants. However, the scarcity of public housing units
ensures that a large proportion of low-income tenants must rely on
the private rental market to meet their housing needs. As illustrated
in Re Webb, 179 those who live in publicly subsidized housing are
entitled to a lower level of procedural fairness. Lower-income
tenants are likely to be disadvantaged under the rent review process
as well.
The Economics of Rent Review: The genesis of rent review is the
scarcity of housing units. The supply side of the housing market is
notoriously slow to react to increases in demand, which explains the
preoccupation of government and the private market alike with
statistics related to housing starts. Rent increases are the market
solution to choking off demand and maintaining some sort of
balance, or equilibrium, in the marketplace. This creates a
particular problem for low-income tenants who often have no
alternative housing available to allow them to escape unaffordable
rent increases. The objective of rent review is to control rent
increases and offer protection primarily to those who are unable to
protect themselves. Thus, rent review programs are often billed as a
social justice program for the poor.
Rent review pertains only to the price of rental housing and may
encourage tenant selection based on nonprice characteristics, such
as age, size of family, and occupation. Lower-income tenants will
be disadvantaged by the lack of informal information networks,
177. S.N.S. 1975, c. 56, s. 4. There are specific exemptions from the statute for
universities, hospitals, maternity homes, nursing homes, hotels, boarding homes,
and colleges.
178. Herring Cove Housing Co-operative, December 22, 1982. A decision of
Randall Duplac, Chairman of the Nova Scotia Rent Review Commission (file no.
11927.00), holds that nonprofit cooperative housing developments also fall outside
the control of the rent review process. Section 38(b) of Nova Scotia's Rent Review
Act also allows exclusions by regulation and, in January 1983, all premises were
excluded from rent review for the three-year period after the first occupancy. N.S.
Reg. 218/82, October 14, 1982.
179. Supra, note 12.
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such as word-of-mouth and the passing on of units to "desirable"
tenants without advertising. The economic incentive to landlords to
encourage such networks are numerous. Desirable tenants are those
who are rarely home (and, thus, use less power and fewer services),
have no children or pets (and cause less wear and tear on property),
are financially stable (offering less risk of nonpayment of rent), and
are long-term (resulting in a reduction in the administrative cost of
change-over). 180 Thus, rent review without provision for security of
tenure may benefit wealthier tenants at the expense of lower-income
tenants. In addition, there is a clear political context which
overshadows the economics of rent review: "Policy issues are
typically translated into a choice between short-term considerations
of tenant hardship and political advantage, and longer-term
considerations of the future of the housing market. Since politicians
commonly discount the future, rent controls are often introduced
when rents begin to rise rapidly." 18
Rent review is favoured over the rationing of actual units as a
means of allocating this scarce commodity. The clearly established
property rights of land owners preclude rationing being carried out
along the lines of equal units for all. Similarly, a concerted
government initiative to provide more public housing stock at the
lower income range would be resisted as an invasion of the private
sector, and providing housing allowances or increasing welfare
payments necessitates higher taxes, which are politically unpopular.
Indeed, rent review may reduce pressures on the public purse in that
fewer people will be forced onto the welfare rolls.
The political advantages of rent review are more apparent than
the economic ones. Once a policy of rent review is adopted, the
problem becomes one of designing a mechanism to effectively
implement it. In dealing with a rent review structure, problems of
fairness emerge. What costs should be allowed to landlords? To
what extent should tenants, as well as landlords, be involved in the
process? These questions can only be answered by examining the
administrative agency charged with the task of reviewing rents.

180. There was considerable controversy in Halifax during 1982 when it became
known that landlords had access to a list of blacklisted tenants, some of whom had
perpetrated no greater crime than that of being on welfare.
181. Cullingworth, supra, note 8 at 47.
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Statutory Rent Review Structures: Most

Canadian provinces

adopted rent review schemes in the 1970s. Although the immediate
cause was skyrocketing housing prices, another underlying factor
was the growing consciousness that there is a right to affordable
accommodation, reflected in a study of the British Columbia Law
Reform Commission of 1973.182 However, the major impetus was
of an economic nature, not dedication to social justice in housing.
By the 1980s, most of the Prairie Provinces had withdrawn from
rent control programs. 18 3 Both Ontario and Nova Scotia introduced
rent review legislation in 1975,184 but Ontario updated its scheme
with the Residential Tenancies Act of 1979.185 It is thus instructive
to compare the two schemes.
In both provinces, the reviewing agency only acquires jurisdiction to review rents when the proposed increase exceeds the
guideline set by regulation. At present, the allowable increase under
both statutes is six percent. The first line of review in Ontario is the
Rent Review Officer and, in Nova Scotia, the Residential Tenancy
Officer (hereafter "the RTO"). Under Nova Scotia's Rent Review
Act, the affected parties must be given notice, but there need not be
a hearing. In exercising his or her discretion, the RTO is to be
guided by the factors in section 11(2), namely return on investment
and the potential adverse effect on the landlord. Most decisions do
not proceed to the second stage of review.
Procedural changes were introduced by the 1979 Ontario
amendments. Each hearing is now chaired by a commissioner of the
Residential Tenancy Commission, who receives cost information
from the landlord. The landlord is then subjected to questions from
both the commissioner and the tenants. Such a hearing is rare in
Nova Scotia. In Ontario, if the first-level ruling is appealed, the
commissioner must prepare a written statement of the reasons for
the decision and forward it to all concerned parties. The parties are
then given an opportunity to file statements indicating their
182. Law Reform Commission of British Columbia Report (1973), in A Report of
the InterdepartmentalStudy Team on Housing and Rents (Victoria, B.C.: Ministry

of Housing, 1975) at 1.
183. In Alberta, controls on public housing were the last to go. Saskatchewan and
Manitoba have largely eliminated controls, but they do still exist in some larger
urban centers, such as Regina and Winnipeg. In June 1983, Prince Edward Island
served notice that it plans to abolish rent controls in the next legislative session.
184. Residential Premises Rent Review Act, 1975 S.O. 1975 (2nd Sess.), c. 12
and Rent Review Act S.N.S. 1975, c. 56.
185. S.O. 1979, c. 78 (now R.S.O. 1980, c. 452).
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disagreement (if any) with the reasons given. 18 6 Nova Scotia has no
such formal procedure, although the Nova Scotia Rent Review
Commission has broad powers to set its own procedures so long as it
87
grants the affected parties an opportunity to present information.'
Nova Scotia's commission operates upon the basis of in-house
guidelines, concerning matters such as the maximum cost allowance
for fuel price increases. These guidelines are neither published nor
disclosed, 18 8 which has led landlords to complain that they do not
know how the commission operates or how they should present their
cases.' 8 9 By contrast, Ontario mandates that all guidelines and
procedural manuals used in the decision process must be open to
public scrutiny.1 90 In general, statutory protections of procedure are
much more extensive in the Ontario framework.
Court-ImposedProcedures:Nova Scotian courts have been eager to
fill the statutory void by using the doctrines of natural justice and
procedural fairness in relation to the Rent Review Commission.
Under section 27 of the act, there is provision for an appeal from the
board to the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal. Courts have readily
granted leave to appeal in these matters. Moreover, review by way
of the prerogative writs has apparently not been eliminated by the
existence of the appeal rights. 191 As happens so often, little
attention has been paid to the privative clauses. 192 Even the
decisions of the RTO have fallen under judicial scrutiny. As a result
186. Amot, R., Rent Controls and Optionsfor Decontrol in Ontario, (Toronto:

Ontario Economic Council, 1981) at 137-8.
187. Supra, note 177 at ss. 19-20.

188. The practice of using secret in-house manuals has been soundly condemned
in Dale Corporationv. Rent Review Commission (June 27, 1983), an unreported

decision (N.S.C.A.). The Cabinet of Nova Scotia responded by making the manual
a regulation and allowing its continued use.
189. Newspaper reports of evidence given before the Royal Commission Inquiry
into Rents, conducted in the winter of 1983, Halifax Chronicle Herald, February
16, 1983 at 3 and February 23, 1983 at 12. This information and the observation
about guidelines appear in K. Pike, "Administrative Law: Field Research Project:
Rent Review Commission", a paper prepared for credit as partial fulfillment of the
requirements for an LL.B. degree at Dalhousie Law School, March 1983.
190. Supra, note 185, s. 82. Also in contrast to the flexible Nova Scotian
structure, ss. 92-119 of the Ontario statute sets out detailed appeal procedures.
191. Rawdon Realties Ltd. v. Rent Review Commission of Nova Scotia (December

30,1982), an unreported decision of Rogers J. (N.S.S.C.), which granted the
remedy of mandamus. However, Francois v. Joseph and Rent Review Commission

(1980), 40 N.S.R. (2d) (N.S.S.C.), held that appeal rights from the decision of the
RTO had to be exhausted before there would be access to the courts.
192. Supra, note 177, ss. 16, 27.
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of R.D.R. Construction Ltd. v. Rent Review Commission, 193 the
RTO is now required to give the reasons for his or her decision. The
court felt that without such reasons, the aggrieved parties could not
properly exercise their right of appeal. In Kesme EnterprisesLtd. v.
Rent Review Commission,194 the Court of Appeal clarified the duty
imposed earlier upon the RTO. It was held that the reasons need not
be detailed, but they must be sufficient to alert the party to the case
that he or she must meet on appeal.
One of the earliest Canadian cases on fairness was the Nova
Scotian decision in Scott et al v. Rent Review Commission. 19 5 In
that case, the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal held that, regardless of
how the process was classified, a duty of fairness is owed to the
parties that appear before the commission. On the facts of this case,
the duty was not met, because tenants were denied access to .the
landlord's financial information - which is the heart of a rent
review case. By being denied such information, the tenants were
deprived of a fair opportunity to be heard.
Courts have been critical of the secretive nature of the rent review
process in Nova Scotia at the RTO and commission levels. As a
result of Yarmouth Housing Ltd. v. Rent Review Commission, 196 a
duty to give reasons has been imposed upon the Commission, as
well as the RTO. The Court of Appeal asserts that the applicant has
a right to know upon what bases the appeal was rejected. One effect
of requiring reasons is the expansion of the scope for judicial review
for abuse of discretion. The court has rejected the argument that
once the Commission considers the statutory factors, it is free to set
rent increases as it deems appropriate. 19 7 However, the court did
accept a deferential approach to decisions of the commission.
Implications: The statutory protections attached to the rent review
process vary considerably from one province to another. The courts
can narrow this gap by imposing common law requirements of a fair
193. (1982), 55 N.S.R. (2d) 71 (N.S.C.A.).

194. November 19, 1982, an unreported decision (N.S.C.A.).
195. (1977), 81 D.L.R. (3d) 530 (N.S.C.A.). These rights were further elaborated
in Rawdon Realties v. Rent Review Commission (December 30,

1982),

an

unreported decision of Rogers J. (N.S.S.C.).
196. (1982), 54N.S.R. (2d) 28 (N.S.C.A.).

197. There was some suggestion of this approach in FortMassey Realties Ltd. v.
Rent Review Commission (1982), 50 N.S.R. (2d) 451 (N.S.C.A.). This case also

held that the Rent Review Commission was not performing a function analagous to
a section 96 court under the Constitution Act, 1867, and hence was not open to the
same constitutional challenge as the Residential Tenancies Board was.
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hearing. 198 This has certainly been the experience in Nova Scotia.
Nevertheless, litigation is an expensive and time-consuming process
which is more likely to be instigated by landlords and middleincome tenants. 19 9 It is no accident that there are numerous cases on
rent review in Nova Scotia and very few on public housing
authorities.
Even with the more open rent review process mandated by the
cases, the landlords still have a distinct advantage over tenants in
the process. It is a classic case of unequal bargaining power.
Tenants do not normally have access to accountants and computers
to assist them in compiling financial data for use at rent review
hearings. Because there is no guaranteed representation of tenants
on the Rent Review Commission, it may acquire a pro-business
bias, favourable to landlords. In fact, the broad discretionary
powers of the commission permit a subtle implementation of such a
bias. 20 0 All regulatory agencies are in jeopardy of becoming captive
to those they regulate by virtue of their frequent appearances before
the board. Finally, it is interesting to contrast the legislative and
judicial approaches to the Rent Review Commission and the Halifax
Housing Authority. The differing financial status of the clientele of
each board is a suspiciously important factor. "The experience of
other countries shows that legal regulation of the rights of private
landlords and tenants tends to advance in step with the financial
20 1
assistance given to either of them."
(ii) Public Housing and the Halifax HousingAuthority
The provision of public housing can be expected to benefit all
members of society to the extent that housing conditions of the poor
are raised to some socially determined minimum standard. Both
those who are rehoused and those who view the improvement

198. Supra, note 196 at 38.
199. Supra, note 175. Dalhousie Legal Aid's involvement in Scott is a partial
exception to the middle-income characterization of the rent review cases. In many
cases, landlords can bluff tenants into paying rental increases before they are
approved. Tenants can be easily intimidated by a landlord and cannot always get
access to a lawyer to protect their rights.
200. For example, a landlord might appear to be "adversely affected" if one
considers rents alone, but not so affected if one considers the annual appreciation in
value of the property. How discretion is exercised in a case such as this involves
value choices and preconceptions.
201. Supra, note 51 at 379.
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benefit. It must then be asked to what extent the provision of public
housing is economically efficient.
Economic efficiency requires the voluntary agreement of all
parties concerned before any change can be made. Of all the
programs falling under the umbrella of "housing policy", public
housing has the greatest potential for promoting economic
efficiency because the benefits of the program are widely
distributed. However, resources must somehow be transferred from
richer to poorer individuals to provide the housing units, and therein
lies the barrier to efficiency. Those who are most able to finance
improvements have alternatives available to them which are more
acceptable than public housing for protecting their sensibilities and
property values. As long as more preferred solutions are available,
voluntary transfers in support of public housing will not be
forthcoming. In addition, the members of more affluent groups tend
to link social problems, such as family breakdown, violence, and
juvenile delinquency, with any form of housing for the poor. Thus,
the location of a public housing project becomes as sensitive and
emotional an issue as the location of a sanitary landfill. 20 2 This
antagonism toward the provision of public housing, which is
displayed by a large and vocal segment of the population 2 0 3 has led
many municipalities to discriminate in the selection of housing so as
to exclude poor families. 20 4 A further obstacle to the provision of
public housing is noted at length in the 1977 final report of
Ontario's Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto. In the short
term, public housing projects are expensive and politically
unpopular. 20 5 The conflict that occurs at the municipal level
202. J.L. McGrew, Resistance to Change Continues to Restrict Public Housing
Choices (1981), Journal of Housing, 375 at 375-81. Ms. McGrew, former General

Counsel for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, has documentee
the hostilities that surrounded the construction of 120 townhouses for low-income
families in Whitma Park, Philadelphia, following eight years of litigation and two
trips to the U.S. Supreme Court.
203. M. Lipman, Social Effects of the Housing Environment, Background paper

no. 4, prepared for the Canadian Conference on Housing, Oct. 20-23, 1968,
(Ottawa: Canadian Welfare Council, 1968) at 21. Lipman noted that the anxiety of
residents in more settled and suburban areas was reflected in their petitions against
public housing being built in their area. Among the reasons cited for this response
were the negative impact on property values and the expected adverse effect of such
a housing project on their own children.
204. Supra, note 9 at 173.
205. Ontario, Report of the Royal Commission on Metropolitan Toronto (Toronto:

1977) at 232.
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between meeting real social needs and maintaining solvency has
been discussed earlier in this paper. It accounts in large part for the
fact that public housing has never exceeded five percent of the
Canadian housing stock.
Halifax Housing Authority: Since the early 1970s, public housing
development in Halifax has been directed almost exclusively at the
elderly. With the exception of isolated units bought from the private
market and minimal in-fill housing, 20 6 the supply of public housing
for low-income families has remained virtually unchanged over the
last ten years. This paper refers to public housing for low-income
families only, unless otherwise designated.
Scarcity, especially of public housing in Canada, inevitably
results in applicants of equal merit competing for a single housing
unit. Predictably, the losers far outnumber the winners in such
cases. 20 7 The selection of any one applicant from among several of
equal merit will be as efficient as any other, and the community
must somehow choose among them. But the final decision becomes
a matter of great importance in terms of fairness in the broad sense.
As a general rule, the scarcer a public commodity, the more
important it is to exercise effective control over the means by which
it is actually distributed to the public. In Canada, the task of
distributing public housing has been assigned to municipal housing
authorities, which reflects the general presumption that local
housing interests are best served by a local authority. They are the
management arm of the "partnership" 20 8 of senior governments
outlined in the NHA; they "manage, maintain and administer
Public Housing Developments, built and financed by the Federal
and Provincial Governments under section 40 and sections 43 and
20 9
44 of the NHA."

206. In-fill housing generates greater density in an existing neighbourhood through
either new construction on vacant lots or the renovation and rehabilitation of
existing units.
207. Supra, note 9 at 37. Rose noted that between 1958 and 1963, waiting lists for
public housing grew only at a moderate rate because eligible families realized the
futility of applying for accommodation that did not exist and which there was no
hope of attaining. Only thirty-eight dwelling units were actually completed for
occupancy by low-income families in Metropolitan Toronto during this period.
208. For Halifax, the partnership would consist of representatives of CMHC, the
Nova Scotia Housing Commission, the City of Halifax, and the Halifax Housing
Authority.
209. R.S.C. 1970, c. N-10.
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One such authority is the Halifax Housing Authority, which was
established by the Halifax Housing Authority Act in 1948.210 It
superceded the Halifax Relief Commission Act of 1918,211 which
set up an agency for the purpose of organizing relief activities,
including the provision of housing, following the Halifax explosion
in December 1917. A brief look at the minimal increase in
low-income family public housing over the last ten years underlines
dramatically the decline suffered by the Halifax Housing
Authority's program in the last decade. Since 1973, only fifteen
new units have been completed in the City of Halifax. A
comparison with the seventy-three units of senior citizens' housing
produced in just the last three years supports the claim that a shift in
policy away from providing low-income housing and toward
providing housing for senior citizens has occurred. The statistics
also highlight the shift away from new construction and toward
renovation and rehabilitation.
The guidelines and directives on policy and administrative
matters which govern the Housing Authority are provided in a
lengthy and detailed Housing Authority Manual, published by the
Nova Scotia Housing Commission in 1979.212 The stated objectives
of this manual are to ensure uniformity by establishing policies,
guidelines, and directives. 213 This manual does not preseptly have
the force of law, although, under special circumstances, public
housing could be managed by the Governor-in-Council, pursuant to
210. Halifax Housing Authority Act, S.N.S. 1948, c. 78. The present act is based
on the Halifax Housing Authority Act, S.N.S. 63, c. 54, as amended by S.N.S.
1970-71, c. 72 and S.N.S. 1975, c. 70. The effect of the two minor amendments

was to change s. 4(1) of the 1963 Act, outlining the number of members required
on the board of the Halifax Housing Authority. According to the February statistics
of the Nova Scotia Housing Commission, the Halifax Board (one of three in the
metropolitan area) manages 1,276 units of various sizes. This represents 45 percent
of the province's public housing units, and about 43 percent of the units under
construction are also in Halifax.
211. Halifax Relief Commission Act, S.N.S. 1918, c. 61. It was the first public
housing authority in Canada and constructed the buildings in the hydrostone area.
The so-called hydrostone area, named after the building material used in
construction, is that area bordered by Kaye, Agricola, Duffus, and Gottingen
Streets. It was later turned over to the private market and has now become a
fashionable neighbourhood. It is difficult to imagine any of the later public housing
projects, Mulgrave Park or Uniacke Square, being in such demand by private
market consumers!
212. Nova Scotia Housing Commission, Housing Authority Manual (Halifax:
1979) Ch. 1. p. 1. The manual is presently undergoing revision.
213. lbid, at ch. 1, p. 1.
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various regulations. 21 4 A potential difficulty with the Nova Scotia
Housing Commission's guidelines concerns the "fettering" of a
local authority's discretion. 2 15 Examination of the chapter of the
manual which outlines general policies concerning applications for
housing would lead one to believe that they are not binding on the
authority. The following excerpt illustrates the type of guideline
which would likely escape the no-fettering rule by leaving room for
the board to make exceptions:
It is the basic principal that the selection of tenants be based on
need. It is the need of applicants rather than their desirability as
tenants which should be the guideline. The principle of tenant
selection in accordance with need must, however, be balanced
with judgement and discretion against the well being of a
particular project. The final decision on selection rests with the
21 6
Members of the Housing Authority (emphasis added).
The Nova Scotia Housing Commission's attempt to structure the
operations of housing authorities does not remove the potential for
considerable discretion in the routine exercise of an authority's
allocation policies. 217 The annual review of a housing authority's
decisions would not necessarily bring to light evidence of bias,
particularly as reviewing officers are in scarce supply and detailed
review is an extremely time-consuming and costly process. It is
essential that potential abuse of discretion be controlled at the time
decisions are originally made and that the review process not be
relied on to identify examples of such abuse. Formal regulations and
guidelines have a further serious limitation, in that they are
ineffective as a means of promoting sensitivity among administrators in their dealings with their clients. They also reduce the
flexibility of management to deal with cases on an individual basis.
For example, a point system is employed by the Halifax Housing
Authority in an attempt to allocate housing according to need and to
deal fairly with all applicants. According to this system, a single
person with no children has virtually no chance of securing housing.
In a child custody case, however, a judge may decide that the child
or children of a single-parent mother are to remain in foster care
214. Housing Development Act R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 129, at s. 33, as amended by
S.N.S. 1975, c. 29, s. 30.
215. British Oxygen v. Minister of Technology, [1971] A.C. 610 (Eng. H.L.).
This case suggests that a board will not be held to fetter its discretion as long as it is
open to exceptions.
216. Supra, note 212 at ch. 4, p. 1.
217. Fish, supra, note 23 at 210.
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until suitable accommodation for the family is secured. Thus, while
the woman is awaiting the custody decision, she is held, by the
Housing Authority, to be ineligible for suitable housing, a necessary
condition for custody to be granted. The applicant is caught between
the guidelines of two different decision-making bodies, each of
which concerns itself with "parts" of a person. The result is that the
"whole" person remains unprotected. Administrative simplicity
may be bought at a high cost to substantive fairness. Indeed, one
person's due process can be another's red tape.
Guidelines have been responsible for a number of inconsistencies
in the treatment of Halifax Housing Authority tenants. The present
application form, for instance, states clearly, "Absolutely No Pets
Permitted". However, those tenants who obtained occupancy prior
to 1978 were not subject to this restriction and many pets are in
evidence in all public housing projects in Halifax. An inability to
adequately police the situation and the lack of clear identification
for each pet makes control extremely difficult. The result is that
incoming tenants feel that the regulation is discriminatory. Another
example concerns the guideline which determines the rent to be paid
by each tenant. A tenant receiving Social Assistance payments and
no other income pays a flat rate according to the size of the unit. In
1983, this was set at $85 a month for a two- or three-bedroom unit
and at $100 a month for a four- or five-bedroom unit. 2 18 An
employed tenant receiving income other than Social Assistance
payments is charged 25 percent of his or her gross income. Thus,
two families living in identical four-bedroom units, both with gross
incomes of $800 a month, could experience a difference of 100
percent in their rents, depending on the source of income. The
employed tenant would pay $200, as opposed to the $100 demanded
of the tenant on Social Assistance. Adherence to this guideline
clearly discriminates against the working poor.
A review of the guidelines concerning tenant selection and tenant
eviction highlights a significant difference. 2 19 This is consistent
with the legal emphasis on the removal of rights, rather than their
creation. The eviction procedures are much more detailed and
demand greater attention to procedural fairness than the selection
procedures do. A brief review, of both types of procedures will
clarify this point. Upon application, a tenant is interviewed by a
218. Supra, note 212 at ch. 5, p. 15.
219. Supra, note 212 at ch. 7.
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housing officer, who begins the point-scoring system. This is
followed up by a home visit from another officer, who completes
the scoring for such items as "health" and "housekeeping" and
who verifies the points allotted by the initial interviewer. The
applicant is then placed on a waiting list, but is not informed of his
or her place in the queue. Although rank is a major determining
factor in the allocation of units, the applicant has no right to be
informed of any change in status. In terms of eviction procedures, it
is more difficult to remove a tenant from a unit once it is occupied
than it is to delay the initial selection, particularly if problems arise
from anti-social behavior and the personal habits of tenants. The
Nova Scotia Housing Commission states that a housing authority
may require the services of a solicitor at various stages of the
termination process, whereas such services are considered unnecessary for the selection process. This is a clear indication that more
extensive protection is awarded to those already in possession of a
unit, rather than to those awaiting possession.
The Halifax Housing Authority recognizes three conditions as
cause for instituting proceedings to terminate tenancy:
"1. excessive or habitual rent arrears; 2. bad housekeeping
resulting in excessive damage to a unit and its fixtures; 3. personal
habits of the tenants which antagonize neighbours, provoking
complaints; or which create a poor atmosphere or bad example in
the community." 220 Eviction is only to be considered after all other
options have been exhausted and rarely occurs during the term of a
lease. If the first of the three conditions exists, a formal collection
letter is sent notifying the tenant that "unless all arrears are paid in
full within one week . . . or a satisfactory arrangement is entered
into for the payment of your debt, we shall consider instituting
appropriate legal procedure." ' 22 1 The facts underlying such
procedures are rarely in dispute. Where the second or third
condition, or both, exist, the manual states that "such complaints
should be in writing and signed" and that all cases "must be fully
investigated using a Community Relations Worker where
available". 222 The "facts" in these cases are more difficult to
document and, since it is not essential that either policy quoted
above be followed in the process, there is considerably more
220. Supra, note 212 at ch. 7, p. 21.
221. Supra, note 212 at ch. 7, p. 24.
222. Supra, note 212 at ch. 7, p. 31.
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discretion. A careful review of termination decisions made over a
period of time would be required to establish, or even to attempt to
establish, whether or not this discretion was being abused.
There appear to be two ways in which the termination policies
could result in unfairness. The first might result from too lenient an
observance of the guidelines. Proceedings initiated by complaints
from antagonistic neighbours could result in the unwarranted
termination of a tenant, even if the complaints were signed. The
stereos, pets, children, and everyday activities of tenants disliked by
their neighbours may be perceived as being excessively noisy, as
compared to the same activities performed by a well-loved tenant on
the same block. There is great potential for abuse, especially in
areas where no Community Relations Worker has investigated the
case. On the other hand, strict observance of the policies may result
in the antisocial activities of one tenant creating an unpleasant and
stressful environment for all other tenants in the area. A recent
223
example from a housing project in Halifax illustrates this point.
Complaints had been received by the Halifax Housing Authority for
more than a year concerning two teenage boys from two different
families in the complex. The accusations ranged from cruelty to
neighbours' pets to vandalism. Yet the neighbours were afraid to
sign statements because they feared reprisal from the parents.
Finally, several tenants reluctantly came forward after witnessing
the boys in an act of vandalism that resulted in over $9,000 worth of
damages. After termination procedures were completed, the Halifax
Housing Authority chose not to renew the existing lease of the
offending families, rather than issue an eviction order.
The preceding discussion indicates that the existence of detailed
regulations alone is neither sufficient nor necessary to ensure that
public housing tenants are treated with fairness. 2 24 The final
analysis must be based on the quality and fairness of results, rather
than the means chosen to achieve them. The solution may lie in
more regular, comprehensive reviews by objective parties to ensure
consistent treatment of like situations, and sensitive, reasonable and

223. Interview with the Community Relations Manager, of the Halifax Housing
Authority, by Margaret Holgate, February 1983.
224. Hughes and Jones, supra, note 151 at 274, note that Britain has rejected "the

idea of laying down a statutory framework for allocation schemes." Fish, supra,
note 23 at 210, also notes that many of the problems that arise from the exercise of
administrative discretion do not lend themselves to legislative solutions.
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fair treatment of special cases. Once again, the courts are but one
means to a fairer resolution of housing problems.
VIII. Conclusion
Law and economics are vehicles for giving shape to social policy,
but neither offer a solution to the problems of housing. At base,
housing is a social and political problem and the most that can be
expected of either law or economics is that they provide a
framework for fair decision-making. One problem which emerges
from this study is the failure of either discipline to properly take
account of the other. Economists have been singularly unconcerned
about fair procedures and appearances of justice, while lawyers and
judges rarely considered the broad economic implications of their
decisions. Because of the high degree of economic illiteracy among
lawyers, the use of economic data in court cases is often
22 5
problematic.
There does not appear to be a coherent housing policy in Canada.
This may be explained, in part, by the tendency of the social
disciplines concerned with housing to compete, rather than
cooperate. Judges often adopt a rather isolated model of
decision-making which deliberately avoids taking account of
political, economic, and social concerns. 22 6 Similarly, many
economists are unfamiliar with the legal framework within which
economic decisions are made. There is recognition of the problems
of single-discipline myopia, of which the following is an example:
Authors seeking to convey an understanding of the policies of
government adopt a variety of approaches to their task. The
history of their chosen field often furnishes their point of
departure, but this approach too readily presents existing ways of
doing things as a culmination of past progress rather than a
preparation for a different future. Alternatively, the task may be
approached through the methods and concepts of a particular
discipline - by studying the economics of the subject, for
example, or the administrative structure and legal powers of the
authorities concerned. But although each discipline is commendably rigourous in analysing the problems it was created to deal
225. One example of this was the apparent neglect of the economic brief presented
by Professor Lipsey in Reference Re Anti-Inflation (1976), 68 D.L.R. (3d) 452

(S.C.C.). For an analysis of some of the problems of mixing the two disciplines,
see C. J. Bruce, The Introduction of Economic Factors into Litigation Cases:
Ontario's21/2 PercentSolution (1982), 60 Can. Bar Rev. 667.
226. Supra, note 128 at 193.
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with, the price of this efficiency is a tendency to resort to
simplified and lazy-minded assumptions 227
when confronted with
problems which fall outside that territory.
The benefits of housing programs are focused upon the higher
rungs of the socioeconomic ladder. Housing policy is largely the
product of a political process which responds to effective lobbying.
Middle-income tenants and home owners are a more formidible
political force than those who inhabit low-income public housing.
The different treatment of these income groups is highlighted by the
case studies on rent review and public housing in this paper. Public
housing has been labeled a privilege, rather than a right, and this
affects both the economic distribution of housing and the provision
of legal safeguards. The time has surely come to recognize the
importance of housing at all levels and to escape the tyranny of
labels. Furthermore, greater attention must be given to the
economic implications of government policies. This is particularly
important with housing policy, which involves externalities. If
low-income families are housed in substandard buildings located in
rundown segments of the city, there will be a social cost, which may
materialize in the guise of crime, juvenile delinquency, unemployment, or marriage breakdowns. Because these costs will be borne
by the whole society, the economic policy may not even be
efficient, much less fair. How can greater fairness be promoted?
One way of improving rights to public housing is by statute. The
legislatures or Parliament can provide positive guarantees of
housing as the equivalent bodies have done in the United States and
the United Kingdom. One problem with this device is that these
"guaranteed" rights may be removed by majority vote. This
provides flexibility for government, but no security for the poor.
Administrative agencies may also be created as a check on the
activities of local housing authorities. This is an important part of
the English model. However, this mechanism presents the risk of
bureaucratic inbreeding. Courts are another mechanism by which
greater fairness can be injected into the housing bureaucracy.
Fairness is used here in the broad sense to mean not simply proper
procedures upon removal of property, but also an equitable
allocation of housing units in the first instance. There is a clear need
for appropriate legal procedures for both the allocation and the
removal of housing. The expansion of the common law concept of
227. Supra, note 51 at 10.
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fairness has been an important means for extending greater
protections to recipients of government largesse. Another hopeful
sign is the movement towards the internal structuring of
decision-making to produce fairer and more predictable results.
Philippe Nonet makes the following stirring call for a redefinition of
the legal role in administrative action:
At issue here is the very meaning of legal procedure. Procedure is
not a way of confining government within the limits of rules.
Instead, it is seen as a structure of opportunities for participation
and criticism, allowing affected persons to challenge and
influence official policy. In this perspective, the function of legal
criticism is less to reduce the role of government than to use and
develop the resources governmental policy offers for promoting
individual and group interests in public welfare. Law can
contribute to the growth of public policy in two related ways.
First the legal process can help to assure positive regard for
affected interests in administrative policy-making. Such use of
law involves in part an enlargement of the meaning of "fairness"
in administrative proceedings - beyond the observance of
minimum standards of evidence and due process, toward an
affirmative search for maximum representation of interested
groups and persons. It also involves a creative development of
opportunities for gaining recognition of substantive rights in
administrative programs. Legal argument offers a strategy for
transforming the "favours" of government assistance into vested
"rights," thus helping to secure and enlarge the benefits of
public welfare. As Charles Reich argues, "Only by making such
benefits into rights can the welfare state achieve its goal of
providing a secure and minimum basis for individual well-being
and dignity. . .

."

This latter point suggests a second way in

which law can contribute to public policy: Legal argument can
transform public purposes into authoritative principles, by which
administrators can be criticized and held to affirmative duties. In
both ways, law helps insure that the benefits of governmental
programs are meaningful228
and that they effectively reach those for
whom they are intended.
The efficacy of the law as an effective instrument for promoting
social policy has been enhanced by the Charter. As discussed in this
paper, the guarantees of equality and security of the person hold
promise for the future. It remains to be seen whether the promise
will be fulfilled, as the reforming zeal of the courts should not be
assumed. Nonetheless, the Charter is not encumbered by the
baggage of weighty precedent and the time is ripe for bold
228. Supra, note 90 at 6-7.
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arguments about the real meaning of Canada's constitutional rights.
The remedial provisions of the Charter provide the power to act.
The courts must be convinced of the need to act.
It is not only the courts which must be convinced that there is a
basic right to decent shelter. Politicians at all levels of government
are an equally important target for education. As long as the funds
available for public housing remain constant, increasing the costs
associated with fair procedures may actually result in the production
of fewer public housing units. Governments must be convinced that
they should enlarge the size of the housing pie, and this in turn will
condition how much money can be spent effectively on designing
and implementing better procedures for allocation and removal.
Courts are equipped to deal only with the issues of distribution, and
will not and should not tell elected governments how they should
spend public funds. Thus, the war for decent housing must be
waged on several fronts.
In both legal and economic terms, housing is a vital matter.
229
Unlike Charles Reich, who blazed the trail in the United States,
Canadian lawyers need not advocate a redefinition of property to
bring public housing under the constitutional umbrella. The
Charter, in particular, invites a classification of public housing as a
constitutionally protected interest. How the courts will respond to
the open-ended language of sections 7 and 15 is still unclear. Some
interesting cases have already arisen to test the limits of protected
interests in Canada. 2 30 However, as indicated earlier in this paper,
the courts may respond conservatively to the Charter. The
development of constitutional rights to fair housing allocation
would be a sign that the Charter is not just another paper
declaration, but a positive commitment to basic human rights, such
as the right to adequate housing. Only time will tell whether the
judiciary will rise to the challenge, and reformers would be
well-advised to pursue the more traditional political avenues as
well.
229. Supra, note 13.
230. Elliot v. Director of Social Services (1982), 17 Man. R. 350 (Man. C.A.) A
termination of a woman's social assistance benefits was challenged as being
contrary to the principles of fundamental justice in section 7 of the Charter. Leave
to appeal has been granted by the Man. C.A.
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